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UNIVERSITY OF  
COLORADO LAW REVIEW 
Volume 82, Issue 2 2011 
CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, AND 
FEDERALISM: SEEING THE TREATY FOR 
THE TREES 
BLAKE HUDSON∗
Despite numerous attempts over the past two decades—
including, most recently, the Copenhagen climate discus-
sions in late 2009—international forest and climate negotia-
tions have failed to produce a legally binding treaty address-
ing global forest management activities.  This failure is due 
in large part to a lack of U.S. leadership.  Though U.S. par-
ticipation in ongoing forest and climate negotiations is essen-
tial, scholars have not fully explored the potential limiting 
effects of federalism on the United States’ treaty power in the 
area of forest management.  Such an exploration is necessary 
given the debate among constitutional law scholars regard-
ing the scope of the treaty power, the United States’ history of 
invoking federalism to inhibit treaty formation and partici-
pation, and the constitutional reservation of primary land 
use regulatory authority for state and local governments.  
This Article argues that due to great uncertainty surround-
ing the question of whether federalism limits the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to enter into and implement a legally bind-
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ing treaty directly regulating forest management activities 
via prescriptive mechanisms, any binding treaty aimed at fo-
rests should include voluntary, market-based mechanisms—
like REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service trans-
action programs—to facilitate U.S. participation and avoid 
challenges to treaty implementation in the  United States. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Forest clearcut with forested buffer zone along watershed1
INTRODUCTION 
 
Nations with federal systems should consider the compati-
bility of treaties with their constitutional orders before con-
cluding them, because any errors are almost certainly  
not a basis for extricating themselves afterward. . . .  Inter-
national Law obliges nations to explore the limits of their 
constitutional structure to comply with treaties.2
Recently, I visited a parcel of private forestland in Ala-
bama.  I walked down a hill to a creek that runs through an 
impressive stand of oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines.  The 
 
 
 1. ALA. FORESTRY COMM’N, ALABAMA’S BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR 
FORESTRY 4 (2007), available at http://www.forestry.state.al.us/Publications/ 
BMPs/2007_BMP_Manual.pdf [hereinafter ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES]. 
 2. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 403, 456, 492 (2003). 
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creek happens to establish the property line shared with the 
adjacent landowner.  Upon reaching the bottom of the hill I ob-
served that the forest that once stretched across the creek now 
stopped at the creek.  The adjacent landowner had recently 
clear-cut the property and had removed the timber all the way 
to the water line on the opposite bank.  This Alabama forester’s 
action was clearly contrary to the state of Alabama’s suggested 
Best Management Practices (“BMPs”) for forests, which state 
that a forested buffer zone should be left along watersheds to 
“[p]rotect banks, beds, and floodplains from erosion; control di-
rect deposition of pollutants; provide shade, food, and cover for 
aquatic ecosystems; [and] filter out pollutants from uplands.”3  
Though private forest management regulation, and land use 
regulation generally, have long been the purview of state and 
local regulatory authority in the United States,4 federal and in-
ternational regulatory bodies have taken a growing interest in 
forest management decisions of the kind made by this Alabama 
forester.5
The international community has increasingly focused on 
global standardization of forest management practices for nu-
merous reasons—based on both environmental and economic 
concerns.  Preventing poor forest management decisions not on-
ly protects local environmental goods and services, like clean 
water and biodiversity, but also provides global goods in the 
 
 
 3. ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 5.  The state of Alabama 
delegates authority to the Alabama Forestry Commission to develop BMPs for the 
management of forests in watersheds.  Title 9, section 10A-4 of the Code of Ala-
bama establishes guidelines for protecting forested watersheds and states that 
“[a]ny management guidelines developed by watershed management authorities 
to protect forested watersheds shall follow the best management practices estab-
lished by the Alabama forestry commission as they pertain to forested water-
sheds.”  ALA. CODE § 9-10A-4 (2010).  Alabama’s BMPs include provisions for 
“streamside management zones” (“SMZs”), which are to be harvested for forest 
products in such a way “as to protect the forest floor and under story vegetation 
from damage.”  ALABAMA’S BEST PRACTICES, supra note 1, at 4.  The minimum 
standards state that SMZs should be established no less than thirty-five feet from 
a “definable bank,” and within the SMZ only partial harvesting of trees is appro-
priate.  Id. at 5.  This partial harvesting should leave a minimum residual forest 
cover of no less than 50% “crown cover.”  Id.  “Crown” is defined as: “The top of a 
tree consisting of trunk and expanding branches.”  Id. at 24. 
 4. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government 
has limited authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the 
states.  Forestland management and use was one such reserved power.”  Gerald 
A. Rose with Douglas W. MacCleery et al., Forest Resources Decision-Making in 
the US, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION 238, 239 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & 
Doris Capistrano eds., 2005).   
        5.  See also infra notes 11, 16. 
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form of carbon sequestration, as governments seek to battle the 
effects of climate change by including forest carbon in the ever-
growing carbon credit market.6  The global benefits of prevent-
ing poor forest management at local scales are enormous, as a 
vast majority of the 20 to 25 percent of annual global carbon 
emissions resulting from forest and land use activities are at-
tributable to forest destruction and degradation—more carbon 
than is emitted by the transportation sector each year.7  Even 
so, efforts over the past twenty years to address national and 
local forest management activities and harmonize forest prac-
tices within a legally binding international treaty have failed.  
This failure is due in large part to the United States’ unwill-
ingness to support such an agreement, even though policymak-
ers and scholars view U.S. participation as crucial to the suc-
cess of any global environmental treaty.8
Regardless of past failures, national governments continue 
to discuss approaches to achieving responsible global forest 
management.  The United Nations Forum on Forests 
(“UNFF”)
 
9 remains the primary forum for “stand-alone” forest 
treaty negotiations,10 which aim to promote sustainable forest-
ry, preserve the numerous ecosystem services provided by for-
ests, and address climate change.  In addition, because forest 
carbon sequestration provides a powerful tool for tackling cli-
mate change, national governments are increasingly seeking to 
incorporate global forest management into a post-Kyoto climate 
treaty.11
 
 6. See Erin C. Myers, Policies to Reduce Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD) in Tropical Forests: An Examination of the Issues Facing the 
Incorporation of REDD into Market-Based Climate Policies 4 (Res. for the Future, 
Discussion Paper 07-50, 2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-
DP-07-50.pdf.  For further information on the process of carbon sequestration, see 
Kenneth L. Denman et al., 7: Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System 
and Biogeochemistry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, 
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF 
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 499, 512 (Susan Salomon 
et al. eds., 2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ 
ar4-wg1-chapter7.pdf [hereinafter IPCC]. 
  Such a treaty has yet to materialize since the fif-
 7. Myers, supra note 6, at 4.  
 8. See infra Part II.B; see also infra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 9. The UNFF concluded its eighth session in May 2009 (“UNFF-8”).  See 
UNFF8 Voluntary Reports, UNITED NATIONS F. ON FORESTS, http://www.un.org/ 
esa/forests/reports-unff8.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010). 
 10. By “stand-alone” this Article refers to negotiations that are outside the 
context of climate treaty negotiations. 
 11. A number of scholars have noted this trend.  See, e.g., A. Angelsen, REDD 
Models and Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); T. Johns et al., A 
Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and Private Forest 
2011] CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, & FEDERALISM 367 
teenth United Nations Climate Change Conference of the Par-
ties (“COP-15”) took place in Copenhagen at the end of 2009.  
Even so, national governments continue to develop both regula-
tory and market-based solutions to address climate change.12  
The U.S. Congress, for example, has considered numerous bills 
proposing a carbon cap-and-trade scheme for regulating indus-
trial carbon emissions,13
 
Stewards Into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458 (2008); 
A. Karsenty et al., Summary of the Proceedings of the International Workshop 
“The International Regime, Avoided Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and 
Private Policies Towards Forests in Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21–23rd 
November 2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 424 (2008); K. Levin, C. McDermott, & 
B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a 
‘Dual Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538 (2008).   
 and various state governments have 
  At the Bali round of the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (“UNFCCC”) in December 2007, the parties agreed to initiate a 
plan, which was intended to be finalized at the United Nations Climate Change 
Conference 2009 (“COP-15”) in Copenhagen, that would lead to the development 
of “next steps” for countries to take to address climate change.  U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-605, CLIMATE CHANGE: EXPERT OPINION ON 
THE ECONOMICS OF POLICY OPTIONS TO ADDRESS CLIMATE CHANGE 16–17 (2008), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08605.pdf.  The United Nations De-
partment of Economic and Social Affairs (“UN-DESA”) described the Bali talks as 
placing “greater attention [on forests] in climate change deliberations not only be-
cause of their role in mitigating and adapting to climate change, but also due to 
growing concerns over carbon emissions, resulting from deforestation and forest 
degradation in developing countries where emissions are considerable and in-
creasing.”  U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, Fo-
rests: the Green and REDD of Climate Change 2 (2009), http://www.un.org/ 
esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief16.pdf.  Furthermore, at UNFF-8 in April 2009, 
many called for both forest carbon and non-carbon values to be addressed within 
any future climate agreement.  UNFF8 Discusses Role of Forests in Future Cli-
mate Change Regime, CLIMATE-L.ORG (Apr. 21, 2009), http://climate-l.org/ 
2009/04/23/unff8-discusses-role-of-forests-in-future-climate-change-regime (also 
see referenced press releases).  Also in April 2009, the UN-DESA issued a policy 
brief asserting that “[t]he global climate change agreement should include actions 
on deforestation and forest degradation within the wider context of sustainable 
forest management.”  U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, UN-DESA Policy Brief 
No. 15, Finance for Forests and Climate Change (2009), http://www.un.org/ 
esa/policy/policybriefs/policybrief15.pdf.  More explicitly, UN-DESA advocated 
that “[a]t Copenhagen in December 2009, it is crucial that countries agree to in-
clude reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in a post-2012 
climate regime.”  UN-DESA Policy Brief No. 16, supra at 4. 
 12. For example, the European Union Emission Trading System was 
launched in 2005.  EUROPEAN COMM’N, EU ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE: 
EU EMISSIONS TRADING—AN OPEN SCHEME PROMOTING GLOBAL INNOVATION 3 
(2005) (on file with University of Colorado Law Review).  See also Emissions Trad-
ing System, EUROPEAN COMM’N CLIMATE ACTION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/ 
policies/ets/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 11, 2010). 
 13. Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th Cong.; 
Dingell-Boucher Draft Legislation of 2008, see Dingell-Boucher Cap-and-Trade 
Bill, INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH (Oct. 7, 2008), http:// 
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already begun to participate in similar schemes.14  Proposed 
legislation at both the federal and state levels has explicitly 
provided a substantial role for forests in mitigating U.S. carbon 
emissions.15
If either a stand-alone forest treaty or a climate treaty in-
corporating forest management were to arise in the near fu-
ture, a natural question would be: How would such a treaty af-
fect federal and state forest management regulation in the 
United States?  A more salient question, however, would be the 
inverse: How does the relationship between federal and state 
regulatory authority in the United States affect stand-alone 
forest or climate treaty negotiations?  More specifically, how 
does U.S. federalism complicate the United States’ role in for-
est management treaty formation given that the federal gov-
ernment is granted authority under the Constitution to nego-
 
 
www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-trade-
bill/; American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. 
(Waxman-Markey Bill).  Regarding the potential role of forests in such programs, 
scholars have noted: 
The international forest carbon provisions in the Lieberman-Werner 
America Climate Security Act (S.2191), [previously] under debate in the 
U.S. Senate, . . . allocates funds from allowance revenues to implement 
and develop [reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation] 
activities but remains somewhat flexible on whether any credits gener-
ated by that activity could ultimately end up as credits usable in the U.S. 
compliance market. 
Brian Murray & Lydia Olander, Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Short 
Policy Brief, A Core Participation Requirement for Creation of a REDD Market 1–2 
(2008), available at http://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/climate/policydesign/a-core-
participation-requirement-for-creation-of-a-redd-market (follow “policy brief 
(.pdf)” hyperlink). 
 14. Examples include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (Connecticut, 
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
York, Rhode Island, and Vermont), the Midwestern Regional GHG Reduction Ac-
cord (Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and the Canadian 
province of Manitoba), and the Western Climate Initiative (Arizona, California, 
Montana, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and the Canadian provinces of 
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec). See North American Cap-and-
Trade Initiatives, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http:// 
www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/NA-capandtrade (last vi-
sited Nov. 5, 2010). 
 15. Scholars have noted that “proposed legislation in the United States (at 
both the federal and subnational level) contained significant provisions on REDD 
and international forest carbon management.”  JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN 
& MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 1203 (2d ed. 2009).  
See also William Boyd, Deforestation and Emerging Greenhouse Gas Compliance 
Regimes: Toward a Global Environmental Law of Forests, Carbon and Climate 
Governance, in DEFORESTATION AND CLIMATE CHANGE: REDUCING CARBON 
EMISSIONS FROM DEFORESTATION AND FOREST DEGRADATION 1, 9–13 (Valentina 
Bosetti & Ruben Lubowski eds., 2010). 
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tiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary land 
use regulatory authority for activities like private forest man-
agement? 
This Article expands a policy analysis recently published 
by the author and Professor Erika Weinthal, summarizing the 
political science theory in the field of global forest regime for-
mation and suggesting policy mechanisms for avoiding the con-
sequences of potential federalism-based complications.16  This 
Article further develops and explores the legal bases for, and 
implications of, U.S. federalism’s potential limiting effect on 
the treaty power in the area of global forest management.  
Such an exploration is important as a vigorous debate contin-
ues among constitutional law scholars regarding the scope of 
the treaty-making power established in Article II of the U.S. 
Constitution.  As discussed below, many scholars argue that, in 
light of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions17 reasserting fed-
eralism constraints on the federal government’s power (i.e., the 
“new federalism”18), federalism acts as a restraint on the Unit-
ed States’ ability to implement international treaties requiring 
the passage of federal legislation that would not, standing 
alone, pass constitutional muster.19  Direct federal regulation 
of private forest management would be just the type of con-
gressional legislation that new federalists would argue is un-
constitutional, given that states maintain primary regulatory 
authority over land use.20
 
 16. Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees: 
How U.S. Federalism can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT. 
RESOURCES POL’Y RES. 353 (2009). 
  Other scholars, supporting the “na-
tionalist” perspective, assert that the treaty power is not so li-
mited.  They argue that if implemented pursuant to an inter-
national treaty, the federal government may assert regulatory 
 17. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United 
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992). 
 18. Swaine, supra note 2, at 403. 
 19. See id.; see generally Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American 
Federalism (pts. 1 & 2), 97 MICH. L. REV. 390 (1998) [hereinafter Bradley I], 99 
MICH. L. REV. 98 (2000) [hereinafter Bradley II]; Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing 
the Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities That Don’t 
“Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing the Realities of the New 
Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167 (2004); Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federal-
ism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1327 (2006); Nicholas Q. Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1867 (2005). 
 20. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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authority over subject matters—even those traditionally regu-
lated by state governments—that it would be unable to regu-
late in the absence of a treaty.21
It is unlikely that the debate over whether federalism 
places limits on the United States’ treaty-making power will be 
resolved anytime soon.
 
22  Given the United States’ record of al-
lowing federalism to inhibit its participation in international 
treaties in the past,23
 
 21. David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Founda-
tions of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 
1258 (2000).  Professor Hollis succinctly detailed the two camps that have 
emerged regarding the scope of the treaty power: 
 however, it is crucial to explore questions 
regarding U.S. federalism’s potential effect on international 
forest negotiations.  This Article argues that due to the uncer-
  In one camp lie the reigning “nationalists.”  Nationalists contend that 
the Supreme Court definitively, and correctly, resolved the question of 
federalism constraints on the treaty power in Missouri v. Holland.  The 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
encapsulates this view, relying on Missouri for the proposition that “the 
Tenth Amendment, reserving to the several States the powers not dele-
gated to the United States, does not limit the power to make treaties or 
other agreements.”  Nationalists thus reject the idea that federalism im-
poses subject matter limitations on the conclusion or implementation of 
treaties, even for subjects Congress could not otherwise regulate in the 
treaty’s absence. 
  In the other camp reside the rebellious “new federalists.”  New fede-
ralists reject the orthodoxy’s view of Missouri in light of: (1) the Supreme 
Court’s renewed willingness to protect states’ rights under the banner of 
federalism; and (2) the expansion of treaty-making to include new proce-
dures and subjects previously thought to be of distinctly local concern.  
New federalists contend that the Court could, or should, restrict the sub-
jects the United States may regulate by treaty—or Congress’s ability to 
implement them—to accord with existing limits on Congress’s enumer-
ated powers.  They also support imposing other federalism-based restric-
tions, such as the anticommandeering principle, to restrain the processes 
by which the federal government imposes treaty obligations on the 
states.  Thus, new federalists suggest the Supreme Court should read 
Missouri more narrowly or overrule it entirely. 
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1330–31 (citations omitted). 
 22. As an example of how deep the rift between the two camps runs, Hollis 
noted: 
To support their textual and structural conclusions, both nationalists 
and new federalists turn to history. . . .  [N]ationalists claim that the 
Framers did not envision constitutional limitations for treaties . . . .  
New federalists review the same materials and reach the opposite con-
clusion. . . .  Beyond the Founding materials, both sides present subse-
quent historical evidence to bolster—or undermine—their respective in-
terpretations.  Often they rely on the same source. 
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1340–42. 
 23. See infra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
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tainty surrounding the scope of the treaty power, and because 
federalism may limit federal regulatory authority over land use 
activities like private forest management, for any international 
forest treaty to succeed at the national and subnational lev-
els—and thus promote the protection of carbon, ecosystem ser-
vice, and other sustainable management values of forests—the 
United States will need to go to the bargaining table promoting 
voluntary, market-based programs that allow its private forest 
owners to voluntarily participate in the federal program.  The 
incorporation of market-based mechanisms—such as reduction 
of emissions from deforestation and degradation (“REDD”), for-
est certification, and ecosystem service transaction pro-
grams24—into an international treaty would both avoid failure 
of treaty implementation in the United States, as well as po-
tentially spur treaty creation in the first instance given the 
United States’ crucial role in international environmental trea-
ty formation.25  Because market-based mechanisms, unlike 
prescriptive dictates, allow private forest owners to participate 
in the federal program on a voluntary basis, they do not require 
the federal government to directly regulate private lands—a 
role traditionally reserved for state governments under the 
U.S. federal system.26  Thus, market-based mechanisms would 
avoid the federalism complications of direct federal prescriptive 
regulation of private forestlands, and the United States could 
successfully implement the treaty domestically.27
The aim of this Article is to employ legal analysis and poli-
cy assessment to demonstrate how to best reconcile U.S. fede-
 
 
 24. See infra note 173. 
 25. See infra notes 69–70 and accompanying text. 
 26. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354.  This is not to say that the 
United States is the only federal country that might face issues of domestic im-
plementation as described in this Article.  Analysis of those systems, however, is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  For example, Canada’s Constitution Act of 1867 
grants the provincial governments exclusive responsibility for forest management.  
Constitution Act § 92(5), 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, 
app. II, no. 5 (Can.).  In fact, scholars have noted that the 1982 amendments to 
Canada’s Constitution placed it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily 
responsible for forest management.”  DAVID R. BOYD, UNNATURAL LAW: 
RETHINKING CANADIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 133 (2003).  It should 
be noted, however, that under the Canadian Constitution the federal government 
does retain the role of participating in international negotiations “related to the 
conservation and use of forests.”  Id. at 132. 
 27. An assessment of the viability of these programs in achieving the benefits 
they purport to provide is beyond the scope of this Article.  As the citations in this 
Article indicate, however, numerous scholars believe these programs to be an ef-
fective policy response to protect forests globally. 
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ralism with the treaty power and global governance of forests.  
Part I details the current state of international forest gover-
nance negotiations and briefly summarizes how climate change 
provides an impetus to remedy past failures to achieve binding 
global governance of forests.  Part II describes and explains 
how the United States, though integral to the success of any in-
ternational treaty on forests, maintains a potential federalism-
based veto power, and how treaty negotiators may avoid this 
potential impediment to forest treaty formation.  Part III 
summarizes the current state of debate on potential federalism 
constraints on the treaty power, including an examination of 
the seminal treaty power case of Missouri v. Holland,28
I.  CLIMATE CHANGE: A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO INCLUDE 
FOREST MANAGEMENT IN A BINDING GLOBAL TREATY 
 and 
concludes that the debate raises serious questions about 
whether the United States federal government may directly re-
gulate certain private land uses, such as forest management, 
despite entering into a binding international treaty for the 
management and protection of forests.  The Article concludes 
that due to the uncertainty over federalism’s potential limiting 
effects on the treaty power, market-based, voluntary mechan-
isms could pave the way for the U.S. to enter into, and imple-
ment, a global treaty aimed at forest management, notwith-
standing the continued debate on federalism and the scope of 
the treaty power. 
Though global forest management treaty discussions have 
repeatedly met difficulties over the past two decades, increas-
ing concern over climate change has reopened the door for 
coordinated international action on forests.  Potential govern-
ment action on climate change raises many questions for pri-
vate forest owners in the United States.  Would a nation-wide 
climate change scheme enacted pursuant to a global treaty 
open up the carbon market beyond U.S. borders, giving forest 
owners crucial incentives provided by access to the worldwide 
carbon market?  Could the Alabama forester noted above be 
persuaded to leave the forest intact under such a scheme if 
economically valuable carbon credits were made available or if 
paid by industrial polluters seeking to offset emissions?  If so, 
these carbon incentives would have the effect not only of pre-
 
 28. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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serving carbon values but also of promoting sustainable for-
estry and protecting numerous other goods and services pro-
vided by forests. 
Climate change has also altered the governmental level at 
which localized private forest management activities are scru-
tinized.  For example, at what scale are sustainable private 
forest owner directives or incentives most appropriately im-
plemented—at the state, federal, or international level?  Which 
entities are best situated to design forest management direc-
tives that will capture the full environmental and economic 
value of the resource—local communities and state govern-
ments, which have on-the-ground access to the best informa-
tion and are able to more efficiently allocate resources?  Na-
tional and international governmental entities, which can more 
readily account for forest values beyond local scales?  Or per-
haps private bodies, which maintain an increasing stake in 
how local forest resources are managed? 
These considerations and questions exemplify the increa-
singly complex nature of modern forest management, especially 
given the role of forests in climate change.  A forested wa-
tershed in rural Alabama demonstrates how private individu-
als, subject to state regulations, could potentially interact in a 
federal regulatory scheme that might arise out of global treaty 
negotiations.  In reality, the Alabama forest I visited stretched 
far beyond the opposite creek bank and actually extended 
around the world, as forest managers are increasingly consider-
ing forests’ potential to provide not only local communities, but 
also the global community, with a wealth of ecosystem and 
economic resources—not the least of which is a substantial 
means of fighting climate change.29
Indeed, international harmonization of forest management 
practices has occupied an increasingly important place on the 
world stage during the last twenty years.  Since the late 1980s, 
countries promoting formal global action on forest practices 
have made numerous attempts to forge a legally binding inter-
national forest treaty but repeatedly have been denied.  Vari-
ous international fora have considered the creation of such a 
treaty: the 1992 UN Conference on the Environment and De-
velopment (“UNCED”) in Rio de Janeiro; four proceedings of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (“IPF”) between 1995 
and 1997; four proceedings of the Intergovernmental Forum on 
 
 
 29. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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Forests (“IFF”) between 1997 and 2000; and most recently nu-
merous proceedings of the UNFF in the 2000s.30  None of these 
negotiations resulted in a treaty, and some scholars have de-
scribed forest treaty discussions as “a resounding failure.”31  
Though scholars have suggested a variety of reasons for these 
failures,32
 
 30. Radoslav S. Dimitrov et al., International Nonregimes: A Research Agen-
da, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2006); see also S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards 
the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 550, 552 
(2008); Deborah S. Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the 
International Arrangement on Forests: UNFF-5, -6, and -7, 15 REV. OF EUR. CMTY. 
& INT’L ENVTL. L. 316 (2006).  Davenport and Wood describe the chronology of 
discussions over a forest treaty since 1992 as follows: 
 as discussed further in Part II.B below, one of the 
International forest policy negotiations have often been characterized by 
political entrenchment . . . .  Since the failure at the 1992 [UNCED] in 
Rio de Janeiro to achieve a legally binding forest convention, several fora 
have been developed in order to allow international forest policy discus-
sions to continue . . . .  [But a] convention specifically addressing forests 
eluded consensus. . . .  [T]he [IPF] was established as an expert body un-
der the UN Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), with a 2-
year work programme intended to combat deforestation and forest de-
gradation.  The IPF . . . led to the creation of the [IFF] in 1997 . . . .  The 
UNFF was then formed, with a plan of action that centered on imple-
mentation of the IPF/IFF proposals for action. . . .  [T]he creation of the 
UNFF had less to do with monitoring the implementation of the propos-
als for action than it had to do with compromise: the need to counter the 
disappointment of some at the lack of an agreement to negotiate a forest 
convention with the creation of a new, more permanent forum with a 
substantially higher level of political authority. 
Id. at 316–17. 
 31. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental 
Regime Formation, 47 INT’L STUD. Q. 123, 134 (2003).  Though some describe 
these efforts as a failure, later rounds of the UNFF have at least shown increased 
attention to the issue of a binding treaty.  One scholar noted that “[t]he negotia-
tions for [a non-legally binding instrument] that took place at UNFF-7 followed on 
from a . . . decision negotiated at UNFF-5 and UNFF-6 and represent[s] a com-
promise between pro-convention and anti-convention forces.”  Deborah S. Daven-
port, UNFF-7: The Way Forward, 37 COMMONWEALTH FORESTRY ASS’N NEWSL. 
6–7 (2007). 
 32. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 353–54 (“At UNCED conflicts 
erupted over trade issues between developed and developing countries, stifling 
agreement on a ‘new legal instrument on forests.’  Both at UNCED and subse-
quent forest conferences, progress has been stymied by developing countries con-
cerned that a binding treaty would negatively affect developing economies by re-
gulating tropical forests more stringently than the temperate and boreal forests of 
the developed world.  As the use of market-based mechanisms to address global 
forest issues has become more popular, this concern has morphed into a fear of 
‘forest colonialism,’ whereby the developed world would pay for the right to con-
tinue emitting carbon into the atmosphere while at the same time limiting devel-
opment of forested lands in the developing world.”) (citations omitted).  See also 
Dimitrov, supra note 31, at 135; TOM GRIFFITHS, FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, 
SEEING ‘RED’?: ‘AVOIDED DEFORESTATION’ AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
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most significant impediments to treaty formation has been the 
United States’ inability to consistently support a legally bind-
ing international forest management agreement.33
A.  The United Nations Forum on Forests 
  The follow-
ing Sections A and B introduce the primary international fo-
rums that have considered harmonization of forest 
management practices via international treaty.  Section C 
briefly discusses the inertia toward utilizing climate change as 
a vehicle for addressing forest management globally. 
The primary forum facilitating debate on global gover-
nance of forests is the UNFF.  The UNFF promotes sustainable 
forestry, solutions to climate change, and preservation of the 
varied ecosystem services provided by global forests.34  As 
noted above, however, international negotiations leading up to 
the current UNFF talks have failed to achieve binding global 
forest governance.  The Rio rounds of forest talks in 1992 only 
produced a non-binding statement of principles.35  A binding 
forest treaty was never even placed on the negotiation agenda 
because the G-77 group of developing countries largely viewed 
a treaty as a means for the developed world to raise trade bar-
riers.36  Furthermore, the G-77 believed developed countries 
were pressuring them to take economically detrimental “action 
to protect tropical forests while” at the same time refusing to 
enforce the same regulations on temperate and boreal forests.37
 
PEOPLES AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES 1 (2007), available at http://www. 
forestpeoples.org/documents/ifi_igo/avoided_deforestation_red_jun07_eng.pdf. 
  
 33. See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of 
the UNCED Forest Negotiations, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 105, 105; see 
also Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global For-
est Politics, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Nov. 2005, at 1, 9–10. 
 34. Such ecosystem services include enhancing managed forests’ role in wa-
tershed protection and flood control; protecting habitat, biodiversity, and genetic 
resources; and preserving cultural and recreational values.  See Bastiaan Louman 
et al., 1: Forest Ecosystem Services: A Cornerstone for Human Well-Being, in INT’L 
UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., ADAPTATION OF FORESTS AND PEOPLE TO 
CLIMATE CHANGE—A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 15, 16–20 (Risto Seppälä, Al-
exander Buck, & Pia Katila eds., 2009), available at http://www.iufro.org/science/ 
gfep/embargoed-release/download-by-chapter/ (follow “Download chapter 1” hyper-
link). 
 35. Dimitrov, supra note 31, at 135. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
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Subsequent IPF, IFF, and UNFF discussions stagnated over 
similar issues.38
A key reason for the failure to achieve a stand-alone treaty 
is the United States’ retraction of its support for a legally bind-
ing international agreement on forest management.
 
39  As dis-
cussed in greater detail below, numerous scholars have cited 
the United States as the most influential country in the inter-
national environmental governance system, and the United 
States was actually the first country to propose a stand-alone, 
binding forest convention.40  Although the United States was 
unable to push through a binding agreement in the early 
1990s, its official reversal of support for binding international 
forest management in 1997 has made it more difficult for the 
international community to revisit the issue.41  The United 
States’ reversal represented a domestic political shift that em-
braced the argument put forth by developing countries opposed 
to a binding treaty—that national sovereignty in the forest sec-
tor is more valuable than benefits derived from an internation-
al forest treaty.42
Despite U.S. recalcitrance in past stand-alone forest nego-
tiations, the 2007 UNFF talks showed signs of progress, result-
ing in a “Non-legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Prin-
ciples for a Global Consensus on the Management, 
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Fo-
rests.”
 
43  This instrument was meant to promote sustainable 
forest management worldwide by encouraging national action 
and international cooperation.44  Though the Statement was a 
positive step forward, some scholars claim that the instrument 
“looks unlikely to achieve any real consolidation of global forest 
governance,”45
 
 38. Id. at 136–37. 
 while others note that the failure to achieve a 
 39. See Dimitrov, supra note 33, at 10. 
 40. Davenport, supra note 33, at 105. 
 41. Id. at 126–37. 
 42. See Imme Scholz, A Forest Convention—Yes or No?, GER. DEV. INST. (DIE) 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 15 (2004), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-
Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C70602 
33&lng=en&id=27768 (follow “English PDF” hyperlink). 
 43. G.A. Res. 62/98, annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/98, at 3–4 (Jan. 31, 2008), 
available at http://www.fao.org/forestry/14717-03d86aa8c1a7426cf69bf9e2f5023bb 
12.pdf. 
 44. U.N. Forum on Forests, Rep. of the 7th Sess., Feb. 24, 2006–Apr. 27, 2007, 
U.N. Doc. E/2007/42 (2007). 
 45. Guéneau & Tozzi, supra note 30, at 551. 
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legally binding stand-alone forest agreement “remains a set-
back.”46
B.  The United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
 
The other major forum considering global governance of  
forests is the United Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change (“UNFCCC”), which also previously failed to 
create a binding instrument establishing a significant role for 
forests in mitigating atmospheric carbon levels.47  The current 
leading UNFCCC treaty on climate change, the Kyoto Protocol 
(adopted in 1997 and entered into force in 2005), is a multila-
teral environmental agreement assigning binding carbon re-
duction targets and timetables to “Annex I,” or industrialized 
nations, as well as general commitments for all member coun-
tries.48  The protocol, however, has largely ignored forest man-
agement as a means of achieving carbon sequestration goals, as 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation have not 
been integrated into Kyoto targets.49  Rather, the protocol’s ef-
fectiveness has been measured primarily with reference to its 
direct regulation of industry emitters to achieve a reduction of 
greenhouse gases.50
 
 46. Katharina Kunzmann, The Non-legally Binding Instrument on Sustain-
able Management of All Types of Forests - Towards a Legal Regime for Sustaina-
ble Forest Management?, 9 GER. L.J. 981, 1005 (2008), available at http://www. 
germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/Vol09No08/PDF_Vol_09_No_08_981-1006_Articles_ 
Kunzmann.pdf (“The value of this Instrument lies in the advantage that it ties 
together the most important rules and standards of forest policy in one document 
and that it aims to realise sustainable forest management instead of limiting it-
self to a mere repetition of the global objectives of forests.  The Instrument, how-
ever, does not succeed in creating one comprehensive set of all rules applicable 
and desirable for the forest sector, nor does it in fact reflect each state’s responsi-
bility to ensure the sustainable management of its forests.  Furthermore, the fact 
that no consent could be reached on a legally binding instrument remains a set-
back.”). 
 
 47. For discussion of Kyoto’s failure to adequately incorporate forest man-
agement, see Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 544.  See generally 
Benjamin Cashore, Constance McDermott & Kelly Levin, The Shaping and Re-
shaping of British Columbia Forest Policy in the Global Era: A Review of Govern-
mental and Non-governmental Strategic Initiatives (2006), available at http:// 
www.yale.edu/forestcertification/pdfs/ABCFP.pdf. 
 48. See Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra note 11, at 543–45. 
 49. Id. at 544. 
 50. Though the Kyoto Protocol introduced the Clean Development Mechanism 
(“CDM”) for forest carbon offset projects in developing countries, the CDM option 
for forests has remained largely unutilized, as only eight forest CDMs exist.  See 
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Cashore, McDermott, and Levin find that while private 
entities, environmental groups, and government agencies have 
been included in talks to address climate change, forest man-
agers often have not.51  Even though 20 to 25 percent of annual 
global carbon emissions result from forest and land use activi-
ties, and a vast majority of these emissions are attributable to 
forest destruction and degradation,52 forest managers “have 
not been required to act strategically in mitigating emissions or 
adapting to climate change impacts” and “[e]nvironmental 
groups . . . have yet to target their campaigns upon unsustain-
able forest management [and] the lack of adaptation strategies 
among forest managers.”53
C.  Climate Change as an Impetus to Remedy Past 
Failures 
 
Despite previous failures to comprehensively integrate for-
est carbon sequestration into either stand-alone or climate 
frameworks, national governments, the UNFF, and the 
UNFCCC are currently guiding a global effort to capitalize on 
 
CDM Forest Projects Approved for Uganda, Paraguay, CARBON POSITIVE (Oct. 11, 
2009), http://www.carbonpositive.net/viewarticle.aspx?articleID=1683. 
 51. Cashore, McDermott & Levin, supra note 47, at 45–46.  For example, Ca-
shore, McDermott, and Levin note that forest managers in Canada 
have not . . . engaged in substantial interaction with governments and 
environmental groups in regard to climate change.  While there are some 
government research projects on forested lands within Canada, pressure 
to act on climate change has largely been placed on the industry emitters 
rather than on forest managers.  One plausible explanation for this dis-
crepancy could be that the forest products industry is included in Kyoto 
targets, whereas managed forests have yet to be added into national in-
ventory numbers.  Industrialized nations that are party to the Kyoto 
Protocol are required to include emissions from afforestation (creation of 
forests on lands that have been out of forest use for at least fifty years), 
reforestation (establishment of forests on land that lacked forests in 
1989), and deforestation (non-temporary removal of forests) in annual 
emissions inventory reports.  However, forest management—either 
through the regeneration following harvest or removal during harvest—
does not fit into any of the above categories. . . .  It is, therefore, possible 
that interactions among actors in regard to forest management have yet 
to emerge and will do so if and only if there is a regulatory driver (in this 
case, the inclusion of forest management into Kyoto emissions targets) 
that creates overlapping interests. 
Id. 
 52. Myers, supra note 6, at 4; see also IPCC, supra note 6, at 512.  A small 
fraction of this amount is attributed to other land use changes.  Myers, supra note 
6, at 4. 
 53. Cashore, McDermott & Levin, supra note 47, at 48. 
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forests’ great potential to combat climate change54 and to in-
corporate forest management activities into a post-Kyoto cli-
mate treaty.55  In 2005, forests covered 30 percent of the total 
land area worldwide.56  Due to this vast coverage, the UNFF 
has asserted that “mismanagement [of forests] would have a 
significant impact on the course of global warming in the twen-
ty-first century,” and that “[s]ustainable forest management 
can contribute towards emissions reductions and to carbon se-
questration.”57  Additionally, the UNFCCC is increasingly con-
sidering using REDD programs to improve carbon credit and 
offset markets globally.58
Climate scholars have noted that forest management activ-
ities can be augmented to achieve carbon sequestration goals 
through a variety of strategies, including the increase of for-
ested land through reforestation projects, the increase in car-
bon density of existing forests at both stand and landscape 
scales, the expanded use of forest products that sustainably re-
place fossil-fuel carbon dioxide emissions, and the implementa-
tion of programs to reduce deforestation and degradation of for-
ests.
 
59
 
 54. Karsenty et al., supra note 
  Indeed, the burgeoning currency of carbon that has ex-
ploded onto the market has made these types of management 
activities more attractive and has changed the analysis regard-
ing the viability of including global forest management pro-
grams within climate negotiations.  In other words, forest car-
bon credits may very well help both the United States and the 
international community avoid the political pitfalls that 
doomed past negotiations.  The Energy Information Adminis-
tration (“EIA”) projected that the proposed Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Security Act of 2007 would have resulted in U.S. car-
bon credit prices of between $10–$50 per metric ton of carbon 
11, at 424–28; Johns et al., supra note 11, at 
459–63; Angelsen, supra note 11, at 466–73, Levin, McDermott & Cashore, supra 
note 11, at 544–46. 
 55. See supra note 11. 
 56. FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U. N., FAO FORESTRY PAPER 147, GLOBAL 
FOREST RESOURCES ASSESSMENT 2005: PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE 
FOREST MANAGEMENT xii (2006), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/008/ 
a0400e/a0400e00.pdf. 
 57. United Nations Forum on Forests, Recent Developments in Existing For-
est-Related Instruments, Agreements, and Processes 12 (U.N. Forum on Forests 
Background Doc. No. 2, Working Draft, 2004), available at http://www.un.org/ 
esa/forests/pdf/aheg/param/background-2.pdf. 
 58. See infra note 171. 
 59. Josep G. Canadell & Michael R. Raupach, Managing Forests for Climate 
Change Mitigation, 320 SCI. MAG. 1456, 1456 (2008). 
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by 2012, between $18–$80 per ton by 2020, and between ap-
proximately $22–$160 per ton by 2030.60  If such projections 
come to fruition under a post-Kyoto framework,61
Importantly, global carbon trade may provide the United 
States with the incentive to engage more meaningfully in cli-
mate change negotiations and to break from its past practice of 
obstructing international agreements.  Twenty years ago, be-
fore the United States wholly shifted its position on a global 
forest treaty, it recognized the economic incentives provided by 
forest carbon in mitigating the costs associated with climate 
change legislation.
 global trade 
in carbon provides a significant incentive for governments to 
include forest management—at least as it relates to carbon se-
questration values—within a binding international climate 
treaty. 
62  The United States is one of the world’s 
largest energy users and emitters of carbon,63 and as a result 
the potential costs of carbon regulation are great.  If post-Kyoto 
climate negotiations harness the full potential of forests in ad-
dressing climate change and allow the United States to miti-
gate economic impacts via market-based REDD programs, then 
the United States might come to the table more readily and be 
more willing to forge an agreement.  One study found that for-
est carbon, sequestered primarily through REDD activities, 
could “cut the global cost of climate change policies in half and 
reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.”64  In fact, most itera-
tions of proposed domestic carbon cap and trade legislation in 
the United States have allowed for industry carbon offsets by 
investment in, or credit purchases from, approved carbon se-
questration projects—in forests or otherwise.65
 
 60. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., REP. NO. SR-OIAF/2008-1, ENERGY MARKET 
AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF S. 2191, THE LIEBERMAN-WARNER CLIMATE SECURITY 
ACT OF 2007 Fig.5 (2008), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ 
servicerpt/s2191/fig5.html. 
  Opening up 
forest markets by increasing and uniformly formalizing the 
number and types of market-based programs would only in-
 61. These projections are yet to result after COP-15 took place in Copenhagen 
in December 2009. 
 62. See Davenport, supra note 33, at 112, 122–24.  See also infra note 91 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. See infra note 89 and accompanying text. 
 64. Myers, supra note 6, at 25 (citing Massimo Tavoni, Brent Sohngen & Va-
lentina Bosetti, Forestry and the Carbon Market Response to Stabilize Climate, 
CLIMATE CHANGE MODELING & POL’Y WORKING PAPERS 2, 17 (Jan. 2007), availa-
ble at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10263/1/wp070015.pdf). 
 65. See supra note 13. 
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crease the viability of U.S. participation in a global climate 
treaty.  Further, U.S. backing would capitalize on the afore-
mentioned global inertia towards including managed forest 
carbon within the post-Kyoto framework and would compen-
sate for Kyoto’s failure to adequately utilize the world’s forests 
to fight climate change. 
Ultimately, although climate change provides a new oppor-
tunity to incorporate forest management activities within fu-
ture UNFCCC and UNFF negotiations, a global treaty includ-
ing forest management has yet to be achieved.  Just as this 
part demonstrates how including voluntary forest management 
programs in climate negotiations provides incentives to the 
United States to cooperate in global treaty discussions, the 
next part explicates how U.S. federalism may disrupt interna-
tional negotiations on binding forest management if the me-
chanisms for achieving forest management are prescriptive in 
nature. 
II.  U.S. FEDERALISM AS A VETO POWER OVER GLOBAL FOREST 
MANAGEMENT 
While climate change provides a new opportunity for the 
United States to cooperate politically with international nego-
tiations on forest management activities, a more important 
question is whether the United States maintains the legal ca-
pacity to do so.  Though politics matter a great deal in global 
environmental governance, without adequate legal institutions 
to translate politics into policy, global treaties will not be im-
plemented on domestic scales.  It is unclear whether the United 
States maintains a sufficient legal institution to implement 
global forest management objectives domestically.  In fact, the 
United States possesses a potential veto power over any inter-
national treaty that addresses forest management, arising di-
rectly out of its domestic constitutional structure.  The follow-
ing sections explore the implications of this veto power, with 
Section A first discussing the political science undergirding it.  
Section B explains the United States’ importance to successful 
global negotiations on forests, while Section C examines fed-
eralism’s potential to limit U.S. participation in those negotia-
tions.  Finally, Sections D and E analyze, respectively, the ten-
sion between international legal norms and domestic 
federalism and how that tension can be avoided in the context 
of U.S. participation in global forest negotiations. 
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A.  The Political Science of Forests, Federalism, and 
Treaties 
Recently, Professor Erika Weinthal66 and I undertook a po-
litical science analysis of U.S. federalism’s potential effects on 
global forest treaty negotiations in the event that either a le-
gally binding stand-alone forest treaty or a post-Kyoto climate 
treaty incorporating forest management emerged from future 
UNFF or climate negotiations.67  Particularly important to our 
analysis were the questions of what mechanisms any treaty 
aimed at forest management might employ and what require-
ments the treaty would impose upon participating countries.68  
Weinthal and I argued that these questions are particularly 
important to the United States, a nation viewed as crucial to 
the success of both climate and international forest negotia-
tions,69
the US’s own domestic governance structure complicates its 
role in the creation of any legally binding treaty that in-
volves the potential direct regulation of land use by the fed-
eral government.  The US’s governmental system of federal-
ism, engrained in the US Constitution and receiving 
protection by the US judiciary,  causes domestic implemen-
tation of certain international forest governance scenarios to 
be more viable than others.
 because 
70
 
 66. Professor of environmental policy at the Nicholas School of the Environ-
ment, Duke University. 
 
 67. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16. 
 68. Id. at 354. 
 69. See Davenport, supra note 33. 
 70. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354 (citation omitted).  For a gen-
eral discussion of domestic constraints in international bargaining, see Peter B. 
Evans, Building an Integrative Approach to International and Domestic Politics: 
Reflections and Projections, in DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL 
BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 397, 397–430 (Peter B. Evans, Harold K. 
Jacobson & Robert D. Putnam eds., 1993).  For a general comparative study of the 
role of federalism in environmental regulations in the United States and Europe, 
see Daniel Kelemen, Environmental Federalism in the United States and the Eu-
ropean Union, in GREEN GIANTS? ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 113, 113–34 (Norman J. Vig & Michael G. 
Faure eds., 2004).   
  Scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as embodying “a very li-
mited concentration of powers in the nation’s central institutions. . . .  [T]he origi-
nal allocation of jurisdiction to the national government was . . . modest with the 
unspecified, but apparently broad, residue being left with the states.”  Ronald 
Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative Perspective: A Comparison of 
Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST. 769, 769 (1987).  
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Weinthal and I noted that scholars have focused on “decen-
tralized mechanisms” for international forest governance, but 
have largely ignored the effects of domestic institutional struc-
tures like federalism on international forest management trea-
ty formation.71  This absence is notable since some scholars ar-
gue that to achieve optimal results at the local level, any global 
forest management scheme should provide the greatest amount 
of flexibility in managing forests—or, a “bottom-up” ap-
proach.72  These scholars contend that forest governance 
should retreat from prescriptive approaches—that is, “tradi-
tional governance”—because “traditional governance, focusing 
on a hierarchical, top-down style of policy formulation and im-
plementation of the nation state and the use of regulatory poli-
cy instruments, will be incompatible with this demand for flex-
ibility.”73
Importantly, international negotiations have acted as a li-
mitation on the role of traditional governance for forests by 
making more difficult the use of prescriptive regulation.
 
74
 
Though the balance of power between the state and federal governments shifts 
periodically in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence—thus leading to court “protec-
tion” of states’ rights to a greater or lesser degree than federal power—the judicial 
system resolutely protects the principle that is U.S. federalism.  As Watts noted, 
“[i]n the United States there have been fluctuations in the relative strengths of 
the national and state governments.”  Id. at 773.  It remains, however, that “the 
courts and particularly the Supreme Court have come to play a prominent role 
through their exercise of judicial review to ensure the constitutionality of legisla-
tion and executive and administrative action relating to . . . the distribution of ju-
risdiction between the national and state governments.”  Id. at 789. 
  The 
success of international forest negotiations no longer depends 
upon top-down, regulatory mandates alone.  Rather, negotia-
tions depend upon the participation of numerous private and 
public entities, the promotion of flexibility to allow local go-
 71. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 354. 
 72. See Peter Glück et al., 7: Governance and Policies for Adaptation, in INT’L 
UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., supra note 34, at 187, 190, 195–97 (follow 
“Download chapter 7” hyperlink). 
 73. Id. at 190.  See generally Peter Glück et al., 4: Changes in the Governance 
of Forest Resources, in INT’L UNION OF FOREST RESEARCH ORGS., FORESTS IN THE 
GLOBAL BALANCE—CHANGING PARADIGMS 51, 72 (2005), available at http:// 
www.iufro.org/science/special/wfse/forests-global-balance (follow “Changes in the 
Governance of Forest Resources” hyperlink). 
 74. See generally Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988) (negotiator uses the threat of 
a domestic veto in the ratification process as a means to tie her hands in the nego-
tiations).  Other scholars have noted the trend towards a bottom-up approach for 
forests.  See Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre & Rebecca Hardin, Changing Go-
vernance of the World’s Forests, 320 SCI. MAG. 1460, 1460 (2008); see also Glück et 
al., supra note 72, at 197. 
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verning bodies to participate in the efficient management of re-
sources, and the provision of economic incentives as a driver of 
behavioral change—or, as noted, a bottom-up approach.75  Ac-
cordingly, many scholars no longer see traditional regulation 
prescribed in an insular and rigid fashion by individual nation 
states as the most effective means of achieving global gover-
nance.76
Weinthal and I characterized the impact of international 
negotiations on internal domestic regulatory forest policy as an 
“outside-in” limitation on traditional governance,
 
77 but we ar-
gued that domestic governance structures like U.S. federalism 
constitute an “inside-out” limitation on traditional forest go-
vernance at both the national and international levels.78  A 
thorough analysis of often overlooked “inside-out” limitations 
like federalism is crucial given that the United States’ partici-
pation is a key component for any effective international treaty 
on forests, and that the United States is governed by a “consti-
tutionally entrenched federal system.”79  We suggested that, 
because the U.S. federal system places primary private land 
use regulatory authority within the hands of state govern-
ments,80
 
 75. Glück et al., supra note 
 to ensure the success of any international treaty 
aimed at forests, voluntary, market-based mechanisms—like 
REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction 
programs—must be utilized.  This approach would ensure U.S. 
participation in any legally binding treaty aimed at global for-
est management and would avoid any questions as to whether 
72, at 195–97. 
 76. Id. at 195. 
 77. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355.  An example of “outside-in” 
constraints on the U.S. legal system is the “Tuna-Dolphin” controversy.  Due to 
the vast numbers of dolphins killed by the tuna industry off the western coast of 
Mexico, in the 1980s Congress amended the Marine Mammal Protection Act to 
ban the import of tuna unless it could be shown that the tuna was caught using 
“dolphin-friendly” nets.  RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 567.  
Mexico challenged the trade restriction before the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (“GATT”).  The GATT panel ruled in favor of Mexico, stating that the 
United States could not base trade restrictions on the “process and productions 
method” in violation of Articles I and III of GATT.  Id. at 568.  Instead, according 
to GATT, trade restrictions needed to be product-specific.  Id.  Thus an “outside” 
international agreement on trade placed limitations on the implementation of a 
domestic law in the United States. 
 78. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See infra notes 115–17 and accompanying text. 
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federalism would limit the treaty power in the area of private 
forest regulation.81
The use of voluntary, market-based mechanisms would be 
consistent with the trend in global forest governance demon-
strating a general “downward shift from national to subnation-
al levels,” or, decentralization,
 
82 facilitating the use of such 
non-prescriptive mechanisms.  These mechanisms also 
represent the increasingly promoted “neoliberal” approach to 
environmental governance, which posits that environmental 
goals can be best achieved not through the state prescribing 
targets and enforcing compliance, but rather through imple-
menting voluntary measures and market-based policies.83  
Maintaining consistency with the general global trend of de-
centralization is important for the United States since U.S. fed-
eralism “represents a specific legal constitutional requirement 
for decentralization, whereby a national government is judicial-
ly required to divulge regulatory authority to subnational units 
(the states) in the area of direct forest management.”84
It appears U.S. federalism concerns have not entered into 
the calculus in past forest treaty negotiations.  As noted, U.S. 
negotiators’ past hesitancy to address forests with a binding 
treaty appears to have had more to do with defending sove-
reignty over U.S. resources than with anticipating judicial 
challenges to domestic treaty implementation.
  Other-
wise, U.S. federalism may inhibit the United States’ willing-
ness to enter into, and ability to successfully implement, a trea-
ty related to forests. 
85  Going for-
ward, however, the United States would be more likely to lead 
regarding binding global forest governance if it does not antic-
ipate federalism-based limitations on its ability to implement a 
treaty aimed at forests.86
 
 81. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 
  As demonstrated in the next section, 
removal of such domestic legal limitations for the United 
States will be crucial to the formation and success of any global 
treaty aimed at forests. 
16, at 355. 
 82. Glück et al., supra note 73, at 55. 
 83. David Humphreys, The Politics of ‘Avoided Deforestation’: Historical Con-
text and Contemporary Issues, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 433, 435 (2008). 
 84. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355. 
 85. See Scholz, supra note 42, at 15. 
 86. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355. 
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B.  Importance of U.S. Participation in Treaty Formation 
The United States’ participation is crucial to the success of 
any global treaty on forest management.  The United States is 
a party to only one-third of existing international environmen-
tal agreements and has failed to sign or ratify many significant 
international environmental treaties—including most recently 
the Kyoto Protocol.87  Without uncompromised U.S. participa-
tion, however, a future treaty aimed at forest management will 
not materialize in a way that comprehensively and effectively 
addresses either sustainable forestry or the carbon sequestra-
tion values of forests.88
The United States is one of the greatest emitters of carbon 
in the world, with the second highest total and per capita car-
bon emissions as of 2008,
 
89 and is already considering regula-
tion of industrial carbon domestically.90  As discussed, includ-
ing forests in a post-Kyoto climate treaty would bolster carbon 
markets and potentially encourage the United States to join 
the next climate treaty.  In past climate negotiations, the Unit-
ed States sought carbon offsets—such as those potentially pro-
vided by forests—to reduce the economic burdens of potential 
international carbon emissions regulation.91  In fact, the Unit-
ed States has included carbon offset mechanisms in various 
domestic legislative carbon proposals.92  Forests provide signif-
icant carbon offset potential that may be crucial to achieving 
U.S. cooperation on climate negotiations in the international 
arena.93
Commentators also recognize that the United States’ par-
ticipation and support is a necessary part of any future stand-
alone forest treaty.
 
94
 
 87. Fischer, supra note 
  Scholars have focused on 
19, at 199.  Though the United States signed the Kyo-
to Protocol, it never ratified it domestically. 
 88. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356. 
 89. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/ 
each-countrys-share-of-co2.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2010). 
 90. See supra note 13. 
 91. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356.  See David M. Reiner, Climate 
Impasse: How The Hague Negotiation Failed, ENV’T, Mar. 2001, at 36, 38. 
 92. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356. 
 93. See Davenport, supra note 33, at 123–24 (discussing the economic incen-
tives provided by forests). 
 94. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356. 
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US leadership in the international environmental policy 
arena, not only because of the US’ economic size and influ-
ence but also because the US has some of the most stringent 
environmental regulations in the world . . . .  [T]he US is 
critical to an effective outcome in global environmental is-
sue areas. . . .  [A] focus on the US as a necessary member of 
the pro[-forest agreement] coalition is justified by the fact 
that the US is likely to bear a far greater proportion—in ab-
solute terms—of the cost of any measures required for ma-
nipulating effective agreement than any other single 
state.95
Even so, the United States has forged a “powerful veto coa-
lition in opposition to any further internationally binding in-
strument” on forest management.
 
96  As previously noted, past 
U.S. opposition to a forest treaty had more to do with domestic 
politics and national sovereignty97 than with concerns over fe-
deralism, and the United States has yet to raise federalism as a 
potential restraint on its treaty power as justification for its 
failure to support a global forest treaty.98
Binding forest treaty negotiations are not the only interna-
tional negotiations in which domestic politics have inhibited 
the United States from taking a leadership role on a subject of 
global environmental concern, as past climate negotiations 
have been similarly affected.  For example, during the Kyoto 
Protocol negotiations the United States insisted that partici-
pating countries be able to meet emissions reductions through 
flexible methods—such as the use of carbon sinks—to offset 
emissions.
 
99  The EU coalition and other countries, however, 
supported “strict rules” to significantly reduce emissions.100  
Also, the United States insisted that developing countries be 
subject to emissions reduction requirements, as evidenced by 
the Senate’s passage of the Byrd-Hagel resolution, which de-
manded that any international climate agreement bind devel-
oping countries to the same degree as the developed world.101
Commentators have criticized the United States’ acute fo-
cus on flexibility as contributing to Kyoto’s failure—though 
Kyoto did assign numbers for overall emissions reductions, it 
 
 
 95. Davenport, supra note 33, at 111. 
 96. Scholz, supra note 42, at 9. 
 97. Id. at 15. 
 98. No such instances were found during research for this Article. 
 99. Reiner, supra note 91, at 38. 
 100. Id. 
 101. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
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failed to specify the means by which reductions would be 
achieved, simply asserting that flexibility mechanisms would 
be “supplemental to domestic actions.”102  Furthermore, the 
United States’ political stance that developing countries should 
have been subject to Kyoto targets ultimately led to the United 
States’ failure to ratify and implement the protocol domestical-
ly.103
C.  Potential Effects of Federalism on U.S. Treaty 
Participation and Implementation 
  In the end, despite international recognition that U.S. 
participation is crucial for the success of international envi-
ronmental agreements, the United States has continued to al-
low domestic political disputes to negatively impact its willing-
ness to enter into agreements on both forests and climate. 
Importantly, there is a key difference between the domes-
tic political issues that hamstrung U.S. negotiators in both 
previous forest management and climate talks, which were 
largely ideological, and domestic legal issues that potentially 
could derail a future treaty including forest management.  Fu-
ture international efforts to secure and implement a global 
treaty aimed at forest management may fail because the Unit-
ed States’ very constitutional structure may hinder it from tak-
ing a leadership role.  The United States faces an important 
domestic legal obstacle, largely ignored by scholarship on forest 
negotiations, that may impede its willingness and ability to 
participate in a global treaty on forest management.  As fur-
ther discussed in Part III, there is great uncertainty regarding 
whether U.S. federalism impedes Congress’s ability to imple-
ment binding, prescriptive land use regulations even if man-
dated by international treaty.104  Indeed, the potential for 
management conflicts in the area of natural resources law aris-
es directly out of a constitutional structure that is said to have 
“split the atom of sovereignty”105
 
 102. Reiner, supra note 
 and, thus, to have ignited a 
seemingly unending controversy over the proper division of 
regulatory authority between the state and federal govern-
ments—especially regarding the scope of the treaty power. 
91, at 39. 
 103. See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997). 
 104. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 356. 
 105. U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring). 
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How might this conflict potentially play out in the area of 
forest management?  Suppose the United States enters into an 
international treaty that included prescriptive directives re-
quiring Congress to pass implementing legislation establishing 
nation-wide forest management mandates on publicly and pri-
vately owned lands—such as the creation of nation-wide buffer 
zones in forested watersheds.  The nature of the implementing 
legislation effectively could prohibit U.S. participation in the 
treaty because U.S. federalism divides regulatory authority 
over land use between the federal and state governments.106  
This division of authority presents a unique problem in the 
United States because even though central governments own 
roughly 86 percent of the world’s forests and wooded areas 
worldwide,107 U.S. state and federal governments own no more 
than 40 percent of U.S. forestland.108  The remaining 60 per-
cent of U.S. forestland is in private ownership.  This public/ 
private divide in the United States is a remarkable break from 
the global pattern of forest ownership.  Furthermore, an esti-
mated 89 percent of the timber harvested in the United States 
comes from private lands.109
In turn, private land use regulation is the primary purview 
of state governments, to exercise as a “police power” for protec-
tion of the “general welfare.”
 
110  Certain police powers available 
to the states are not available to the federal government under 
the Constitution; the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution re-
serves for the states all powers not so delegated and may act as 
a limit on Congress’s regulatory authority, “particularly in 
‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land 
use.”111
 
 106. In fact, though related more to political sovereignty than to concerns 
about federalism, the United States’ opposition to a forest convention in 1997 is 
partially explained by its concern that environmentalists would have too great an 
influence over the treaty and its “fears about environmental requirements finding 
their way into the agreement.” GARETH PORTER, JANET W. BROWN & PAMELA S. 
CHASEK, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS 209 (3d. ed. 2000) (emphasis added). 
  Scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and po-
litical opinion holds that this allocation of power in . . . [the 
 107. Agrawal, Chhatre & Hardin, supra note 74, at 1460. 
 108. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www. 
unep.org/geo/GEO3/english/pdf.htm (follow “Forests” hyperlink). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 657–59 (1887). 
 111. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource 
Protection, in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCE LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 
(Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010). 
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United States] leaves the states in charge of regulating how 
private land is used”112 and that “[l]and use law has always 
been a creature of state and local law.”113  The landmark land 
use regulatory case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty114 has been de-
scribed as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state regula-
tion over private property.”115  Most importantly, the U.S. Su-
preme Court has recognized “the States’ traditional and 
primary power over land . . . use”116 and that “[r]egulation of 
land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”117
To be clear, private land use activities are affected by fed-
eral regulations passed by Congress under other sources of au-
thority in the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause or 
treaty-making power.  A number of federal regulations have an 
effect on private landowner activities without violating the 
Tenth Amendment.  Both the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) 
and Clean Water Act (“CWA”), each passed pursuant to Con-
gress’s Commerce Clause power, limit private property owners’ 
land use rights to a degree.  Specifically with regard to forests, 
the ESA prevents certain landowner logging activities that 
might endanger or threaten a certain species, and the CWA re-
gulates “nonpoint” sources of water pollution arising out of log-
ging activities.
 
118  Indeed, courts have rejected state Tenth 
Amendment challenges to congressional authority to protect 
endangered species under the ESA,119
 
 112. JOHN R. NOLAN, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE 
AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008). 
 fish under the Magnu-
 113. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Be-
hind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 
335 (2003). 
 114. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 115. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, 
USE, AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006). 
 116. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 
159, 174 (2001) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44 
(1944)) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local 
governments.”). 
 117. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see 
also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use 
is perhaps the quintessential state activity.”) (emphasis added). 
 118. RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 1308.  Nonpoint 
sources of water pollution are those not arising out of a “discernible, confined and 
discrete conveyance” as do point sources.  Id. at 1012 (quoting 33 U.S.C.  
§ 1362(14) (2006)).  Examples of nonpoint sources of water pollution include live-
stock waste, stormwater runoff from parking lots, and sediment runoff from re-
cently logged forestland. 
 119. Wyoming v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 360 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1238–42 (D. Wyo. 
2005). 
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son-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act,120 
and air quality under the Clean Air Act.121
The effects of these federal acts on land use activities gen-
erally, however, are tangential to the primary purposes of the 
regulations, which are to protect endangered species, water 
and air quality, and other resources—not to directly govern 
how private lands are to be managed generally.
 
122  Rather, 
states currently maintain direct regulatory authority over pri-
vate forest management activities and are at present responsi-
ble for establishing stand density, reforestation, and riparian 
buffer zone requirements; governing clear-cutting practices; 
and implementing a wide variety of other best management 
practices.123  In fact, Congress itself has recognized the tangen-
tial effects on land use related to its regulation of other re-
sources.  For example, the CWA explicitly recognizes federalism 
limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate land use, stating 
that “[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, 
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States  
to . . . plan the development and use (including restoration, 
preservation, and enhancement) of land and water re- 
sources . . . .”124
Additionally, federal statutes may influence state regula-
tion of forest management, as states may pass or modify state 
laws to meet federal clean water and endangered species re-
quirements.
 
125
 
 120. Connecticut v. United States, 369 F. Supp. 2d 237, 248 (D. Conn. 2005). 
  Even so, a review of U.S. judicial precedent and 
traditionally accepted forest management practices may distin-
guish the permissible, tangential influencing effects of federal 
 121. Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 883 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 122. See Paul Ellefson, Anthony Cheng & Robert J. Moulton, State Forest Prac-
tice Regulatory Programs: An Approach to Implementing Ecosystem Management 
on Private Forest Lands in the United States, 21 ENVTL. MGMT. 421, 421–22 
(1997). 
 123. See JAN G. LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (2006).  It should 
be noted that logging is only one activity in which forest owners potentially en-
gage.  Non-industrial uses of private forests are even more clearly in the zone of 
power reserved to the states, as they are subject to state and local zoning and de-
velopment laws.  It seems clear that the federal government cannot establish zon-
ing schemes for states or municipalities.  Some municipalities even use zoning as 
a means of regulating land use related to forestry.  For example, a Pennsylvania 
municipality’s zoning ordinance prohibits clearcutting of forests on tracts which 
are larger than two acres and on slopes greater than 15 percent.  Id. at 871 (citing 
Williams Township Zoning Ordinance 2001-3). 
 124. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 125. For example, states may adjust riparian buffer zone regulations.  See su-
pra, note 123 and accompanying text. 
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statutes on state regulations from potentially impermissible 
federal interference with primary state authority over forest 
management.  Courts have recognized both the CWA and ESA 
as valid under the Commerce Clause, despite the limitations 
they impose on private land use.126  The validity of private for-
est management at the federal level, however, has never been 
judicially tested, as the federal government has never at-
tempted to directly regulate private forest management activi-
ties.127  As noted above, courts have consistently recognized the 
“quintessential” authority of states to regulate land use, and 
just as with zoning authority established in Euclid,128 forest 
management falls squarely within the realm of traditional land 
use activities regulated by the state.129  Due to a lack of federal 
intent to regulate in the area of private forest management, 
courts have yet to extend application of the Commerce Clause 
to private forests.  As such, it appears that the accepted prac-
tice of direct state regulation of private forest activities re-
mains intact.130
Also potentially affecting private land use activities are in-
ternational treaties entered into by the federal government for 
the protection of certain natural resources—as demonstrated in 
the 1920 U.S. Supreme Court case of Missouri v. Holland,
 
131 
discussed below.132  As noted below, however, Holland may be 
distinguishable on its facts, as the treaty at issue in that case, 
like the ESA and CWA, regulates resources tangentially re-
lated to the direct land use activities of private property own-
ers.  In addition, the federal government has never asserted, by 
treaty, authority over private forest management practices tra-
ditionally regulated by states.133
 
 126. See generally GOLDSTEIN & THOMPSON, JR., supra note 
  In short, even though federal 
statutes and treaties may affect land use activities of private 
landowners, the federal government has never before at-
tempted to directly regulate private forest management, and 
115, at 1086–102 
(ESA); RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 826–27, 853–65 
(CWA). 
 127. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 357. 
 128. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 129. Ellefson, Cheng & Moulton, supra note 122, at 429. 
 130. Beyond the scope of this Article is whether federal regulation of private 
forests could withstand judicial scrutiny under an expanded understanding of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—that is, if forest products might be considered 
articles of “Commerce . . . among the several states.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 131. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 132. See infra Part III.B. 
 133. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 357–58. 
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thus courts have never considered the validity of any federal 
attempts to do so. 
Ultimately, because of U.S. federalism, the types of forest 
management directives that might arise out of either a post-
Kyoto climate framework or a stand-alone forest treaty will 
impact the viability of the treaty within the United States and, 
equally important, affect treaty formation in the first instance 
since the United States’ participation in treaty negotiations is 
essential.134  This is especially so since the United States has 
previously invoked federalism as a reason to avoid treaty for-
mation in several other contexts.  As noted by Professor Brad-
ley, “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to enter into negoti-
ations concerning private international law treaties because of 
a concern that the treaties would infringe on the reserved pow-
ers of the states.”135  In addition, in the past “U.S. representa-
tives insisted that they could not agree to a treaty regulating 
certain labor conditions because those matters were within the 
reserved powers of the states.  These states’ rights concerns 
continued to inhibit U.S. participation in private international 
law, labor, and other treaty regimes even after Holland.”136
Other scholars have noted that, much more recently, per-
ceived federalism limitations have reduced U.S. bargaining 
power at the negotiating table by encouraging the United 
States to act in outright opposition to treaty formation, to seek 
exemptions in treaties that modify the obligations of states, or 
to provide concessions to the states in domestic implementa-
tion.
 
137
 
 134. Id. at 358. 
  Ultimately, nations with federal systems, like the 
 135. Bradley II, supra note 19, at 131–32 (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, Ignored 
State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules 
of Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931)). 
 136. Id. at 132. 
 137. Swaine, supra note 2, at 410.  Swaine noted that, based upon perceived 
federalism limits, the United States flatly opposed the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child, sought treaty exemptions for the states with a variety of human 
rights treaties and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and provided 
concessions to the states in domestic implementation of trade matters like the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act.  Id. at 409–10.  Swaine noted that 
recent U.S. practices may persuade [the Supreme Court] to look more 
skeptically at the equivalence of a treaty and its legislative implementa-
tion. . . .  Congress did take specific steps to implement the Uruguay 
Round Agreements and NAFTA, but in each case pointedly impaired the 
effectiveness of the agreement for the states’ sake; in other matters, like 
the Agreement on Government Procurement, the United States more 
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United States, “may decline altogether to enter into a treaty 
that poses a serious risk of conflict with their constitutions.  At 
the domestic level, well-grounded constitutional principles may 
be insurmountable, as may more pedestrian limits imposed by 
legislation particular to the treaty.”138
D.  International Law on Federalism—a Restraint on 
Treaty Participation? 
  Thus, U.S. federalism is 
predisposed to conflict with principles of international law, not 
only in the negotiation of treaties, but perhaps more important-
ly in the implementation of treaties governing areas considered 
the subject of traditional state authority, like forest manage-
ment.  Because the United States has allowed federalism to 
limit its ability and willingness to participate in international 
treaties in the past, it is necessary to gain a complete under-
standing of the relationship between international law and fed-
eralism and of how to avoid conflicts that may arise between 
the two. 
Federal government claims of domestic political restraints 
on treaty implementation are not limited to the United States, 
but such claims gain particular traction when based on en-
trenched constitutional grounds, such as those arising out of 
the United States Constitution.  As Professor Swaine has 
noted, “[f]ederal states not infrequently seek broader conces-
sions based on the political feasibility of national implementa-
tion, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on 
more genuine constitutional limits.  Much the same may be 
said with respect to . . . outright refusals to participate based 
on federalism grounds.”139  With the United States’ federalism 
principles embedded in the Constitution, and a long history of 
jurisprudence developing federalism’s scope, scholars rightly 
have questioned what would happen to U.S. treaty obligations 
if the U.S. Constitution indeed establishes federalism limita-
tions on the treaty power.140
International law and U.S. constitutional law have been 
said to “exhibit a kind of passive hostility toward one anoth-
 
 
forthrightly negotiated internationally and domestically for purely vol-
untary subscription by American states. 
Id. at 420–21. 
 138. Id. at 461–62. 
 139. Id. at 445–46. 
 140. Id. at 449. 
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er.”141  From the perspective of the U.S. legal system, interna-
tional law cannot affect the operation of the Constitution, 
which “operates as an absolute constraint on how U.S. obliga-
tions may be observed.”142  From the perspective of interna-
tional law, however, international law prevails over domestic 
legislation and constitutions.  The rules governing legal agree-
ments among nations, “addressing the formation, application, 
interpretation, modification, termination, and validity of trea-
ties,” are codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“Vienna Convention”).143  The Vienna Convention has 
been described as the “treaty on treaties.”144  Article 27 of the 
Vienna Convention provides that “[a] party may not invoke the 
provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to 
perform a treaty,”145 and this provision has been described as 
codification of a “preexisting principle of customary interna-
tional law that makes no exception for federal states.”146  In 
addition, Article 26 of the Vienna Convention states that 
“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.”147
 
 141. Id. 
 
 142. Id.  Hollis has described “the treaty” as 
liv[ing] a double life.  By day, it is a creature of international law, which 
sets forth extensive substantive and procedural rules by which the treaty 
must operate. . . .  By night, however, the treaty leads a more domestic 
life.  In its domestic incarnation, the treaty is a creature of national law, 
deriving its force from the constitutional order of the nation state that 
concluded it.  Within the United States, therefore, the Constitution gov-
erns.  Just as we look to international law to discern treaty rules on the 
international plane, so too must we look to the Constitution for substan-
tive or procedural rules by which the treaty functions within the U.S. le-
gal system. 
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1327–28. 
 143. DANIEL BODANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 156 (2010). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 146. Swaine, supra note 2, at 450. 
 147. See Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at 339, 340 (“A treaty shall be in-
terpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. 
A/8082, at 124 (Oct. 24, 1970) (“Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its 
obligations under the generally recognized principles and rules of international 
law.”), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1297 (1970).  Swaine has further elaborated 
that 
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Ultimately, international law is supposedly “indifferent” 
toward federalism.148  Arguments that a federal domestic gov-
ernance structure provides an excuse for treaty noncompliance 
have been described as “heretical”149 because “a particular 
country’s constitutional difficulties are its own, and a choice in 
all events that is not to be visited upon the rest of the 
world.”150
suggestions that international law might actually insinuate 
itself into the U.S. Constitution, particularly those provi-
sions governing relations among domestic institutions, 
would surely be resisted. . . .  U.S. courts (usually) try to in-
terpret statutes in conformity with treaty and other inter-
national obligations.  But constitutional law, in the Ameri-
can system, is a different kettle of fish, and in U.S. courts 
even run-of-the-mill federal statutes—including those pro-
tecting state interests—may erase any undesired implica-
tions from international law.  While Supreme Court justices 
occasionally preach the need to pay attention to the legal 
world outside U.S. borders, the Court’s case law seemingly 
limits international law’s potential relevance to the new fed-
eralism.
  Despite international law’s seemingly stern outside-
in perspective on federalism, however, the United States’ in-
side-out perspective is quite different—especially considering 
the rise of the new federalism.  Scholars have argued that 
151
The United States’ reluctance to allow international obli-
gations to impact domestic governance actually merges fairly 
consistently with the true state of affairs in international law.  
 
 
international law addresses federalism indirectly through the meta-
obligation of pacta sunt servanda—the fundamental principle that trea-
ties are to be obeyed—and its corollary duty of good faith (to which I will 
refer, in the aggregate, as a duty of good faith). . . .  This principle . . . 
supports, of course, the notion that a state’s international responsibili-
ties prevail over any inconsistent domestic law.  More particularly, it 
imposes an affirmative duty to bring internal legislation, at whatever 
level of government, into line with treaty obligations.  Nations are un-
ambiguously responsible for enacting domestic legislation necessary to 
implement their treaty obligations, and likewise cannot enforce laws 
that conflict with their international duties . . . . 
Swaine, supra note 2, at 453–54. 
 148. Swaine, supra note 2, at 450. 
 149. Id. at 452.  Swaine stated, however, that it “remains . . . manifestly harder 
for federal governments to ensure compliance, and the abstract availability of  
remedies for noncompliance hardly makes up the difference.”  Id. 
 150. Id. at 451. 
 151. Id. at 468–70. 
2011] CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, & FEDERALISM 397 
In reality, though the position of international law relative to 
domestic constitutional federalism is stated in fairly stark 
terms, international law has in fact treated domestic constitu-
tional law with greater deference.152  As noted, accommodation 
is frequently made during negotiations for federal nations that 
claim constitutional hurdles to treaty requirements, an occur-
rence that “reflect[s] a more general understanding that a par-
ty’s constitutional constraints are less tractable.”153  Even after 
a treaty is formed, international law may concede to the fede-
ralist position.  For example, as Swaine has noted, the 1999 
proceedings regarding two German nationals convicted of mur-
der in Arizona, Karl and Walter LaGrand, were concluded by 
provisional order that sought to limit Arizona’s death penalty 
procedures as a violation of the Vienna Convention.154  The 
United States argued that it could not intervene because its 
federal system imposed limits that designated such procedures 
the sole purview of the states and thus not subject to the trea-
ty.155  The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) ultimately is-
sued an order finding that international law “ ‘did not require 
the United States to exercise powers it did not have,’ but rather 
established an obligation ‘to take all measures at its disposal’ 
to prevent the German national’s [sic] execution prior to the 
Court’s final decision.”156  Clearly, the powers that the United 
States claimed it did not have in the LaGrand proceedings 
were powers that instead were reserved for the states under 
the Tenth Amendment (development of death penalty proce-
dures) and protected by federalism principles.157
The ICJ’s decision in the LaGrand proceedings actually fol-
lows quite naturally from the language of Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention, providing that though international trea-
ties are binding, they must be implemented by countries in 
“good faith.”
 
158
 
 152. Id. at 456. 
  This good faith provision, and the ICJ’s recog-
nition that nation states need not exercise powers they do not 
have within their domestic regulatory tool belt, is arguably an 
 153. Id. at 457. 
 154. Id. 
 155. LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 500 (June 27) (noting that 
U.S. pleadings cited as a “constraining factor . . . the character of the United 
States of America as a federal republic of divided powers”). 
 156. Swaine, supra note 2, at 457 (quoting LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 508). 
 157. See generally Evan Mandery, Federalism and the Death Penalty, 66 ALB. 
L. REV. 809 (2003). 
 158. Vienna Convention, supra note 145, at 339. 
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implicit recognition by the international community that trea-
ties may be constrained by federalism.  Furthermore, a “good 
faith,” rather than absolute, performance requirement recog-
nizes the difficulties in overcoming domestic constraints on 
treaties when there is no enforcement mechanism or when the 
compliance system of a treaty is non-binding (as is the case 
with the Kyoto Protocol).159
Ultimately, international law sends mixed messages re-
garding the legitimacy of claimed federalism constraints on 
domestic implementation of treaties.  Though the Vienna Con-
vention asserts that countries may not invoke provisions of in-
ternal law as justification for failure to perform treaty obliga-
tions, the Convention also requires only that binding treaties 
be carried out in “good faith,” which the ICJ has interpreted as 
an obligation to take only such measures as are “at the dispos-
al” of the treaty-making branch of the nation’s government.  
Just as with the death penalty procedures at issue in the La-
Grand proceedings, direct regulation of private land use activi-
ties such as forest management is not a regulatory measure 
traditionally at the disposal of the U.S. federal government. 
 
In the end, U.S. federalism may act as an “inside-out” do-
mestic constraint on prescriptive “traditional governance” at 
both the national and international levels, just as do “outside-
in” international negotiations noted by scholars.160
E.  Avoiding Federalism Limits on U.S. Treaty 
Participation and Implementation 
  Due to the 
United States’ past tendency of allowing federalism restraints 
to inhibit it from participating in international treaties, in or-
der for international forest negotiations to result in a legiti-
mate and effective treaty addressing forest management in the 
future—and one that can be constitutionally implemented in 
the United States—measures other than prescriptive, tradi-
tional governance regulatory methods will need to be explored. 
Scholars have noted that a global treaty aimed at forest 
management activities would necessarily “mandate some de-
 
 159. BODANSKY, supra note 143, at 86–87. 
 160. See Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 355; see generally Glück et al., 
supra note 72, at 190, 195–97. 
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gree of harmonization of forestry practices.”161  If such a bind-
ing treaty provided prescriptive forest management directives 
at the national level, however, it necessarily would involve po-
tentially unconstitutional regulation of private lands in the 
United States due to the large private ownership of forests.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”) has 
highlighted several forest management goals that could be 
achieved through a prescriptive, “traditional governance” 
framework,162 including “maintaining or increasing the forest 
area” and “maintaining or increasing stand-level carbon densi-
ty.”163  Though these goals can be accomplished by voluntary, 
market-based programs, the IPCC leaves the mechanism of 
implementation unanswered.  Thus, it is feasible that an inter-
national treaty could require signatory nations to “ ‘increase 
and maintain forest area’ by prescribing, for example, manda-
tory maintenance of partial forest cover on all forested lands, 
implementation of soil erosion reduction programmes, or limi-
tation of fertilizer use.”164  A likely response to such a treaty 
would be constitutional challenges in the United States, with 
both private forest owners and states challenging direct federal 
regulation of private and state-owned forestlands.165
 
 161. Ronnie D. Lipschutz, Why is There No International Forestry Law?: An 
Examination of International Forestry Regulation, Both Public and Private, 19 
UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 153, 159 (2001). 
  For ex-
 162. Though climate negotiations are primarily concerned with forest carbon 
only, the IPCC’s findings are relevant to future UNFF negotiations, as the UNFF 
has also recognized the role of forest carbon in addressing climate change. 
 163. Gert Jan Nabuurs & Omar Masera et al., 9: Forestry, in CLIMATE CHANGE 
2007: MITIGATION, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP III TO THE FOURTH 
ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE 
549 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/ 
publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_wg3_report_ 
mitigation_of_climate_change.htm (follow “Chapter 9: Forestry” hyperlink). 
 164. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 358. As an example of how these 
results might be achieved, the IPCC has stated that 
[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon 
stocks include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, min-
imize losses of dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by re-
ducing soil erosion, and by avoiding slash burning and other high-
emission activities.  Planting after harvest or natural disturbances accel-
erates tree growth and reduces carbon losses relative to natural regener-
ation.  Economic considerations are typically the main constraint, be-
cause retaining additional carbon on site delays revenues from harvest.  
The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be diminished where 
increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions. 
Nabuurs & Masera et al., supra note 163, at 551. 
 165. Claims might also be brought under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which grants protection for private property 
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ample, a global governance scenario that required that “within 
x number of years, treaty participants must increase and main-
tain forest area by 25 percent and implement active carbon se-
questration projects on 50 percent of their forested lands” may 
not be viable under the U.S. federal system because the U.S. 
government arguably would be unable to ensure compliance 
with the mandate on even a majority of forested lands within 
its borders.  Federal ownership of forests in the United States 
is only 35 percent.166
If, however, as Weinthal and I previously suggested,
  State governments would claim sole au-
thority to pass laws prescribing increased forest density and 
carbon sequestration requirements on the remaining 65 per-
cent of forests either on private lands or in state ownership.  
The federal government would then be unable to effectively 
implement the treaty throughout a majority of U.S. forest-
lands, constraining the United States’ ability to meet its treaty 
obligations. 
167 
treaty negotiations aimed at forest management incorporate 
voluntary, market-based mechanisms, then these domestic 
treaty implementation complications disappear.168  Indeed, 
these mechanisms arose directly out of failed past forest nego-
tiations as governments “[u]nable to conclude treaties cement-
ing traditional ‘command and control’ regulation in binding 
conventions . . . searched for new mixes of policy instruments” 
to achieve global forest governance.169
 
owners by establishing that property may not be taken by the government with-
out “just compensation,” though exploration of the potential success of such claims 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  U.S. CONST amend V. 
  Provision of such volun-
tary instruments releases the federal government from forcing 
private landowners to manage forests in a prescribed manner, 
which in turn frees the United States from potential federalism 
complications as it implements the treaty.  For example, under 
a climate treaty, the mandatory regulatory requirements re-
 166. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3, supra note 108, at 110. 
 167. See generally Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16. 
 168. For a discussion of a hybrid market-based/regulatory treaty solution, 
based upon a global system of tradable forest conservation obligations or, rather, 
a system of “beneficiaries pay” financing of forest conservation, see Jonathan 
Wiener, Making Markets for Global Forest Conservation, in PAINTING THE WHITE 
HOUSE GREEN: RATIONALIZING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INSIDE THE EXECUTIVE 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 119 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004). 
 169. Michael Howlett & Jeremy Rayner, Globalization and Governance Capac-
ity: Explaining Divergence in National Forest Programs as Instances of “Next-
Generation” Regulation in Canada and Europe, 19 GOVERNANCE: AN INT’L J. OF 
POL’Y ADMIN. & INSTITUTIONS 251, 256 (2006). 
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quired by an act of Congress implementing the treaty (i.e., car-
bon emissions reductions) would fall on industry emitters, not 
private landowners.  Furthermore, both climate and stand-
alone forest treaties would provide market incentives to private 
forest managers, as would any state regulation of forest man-
agement driven by the market.  Forest certification,170 
REDD,171 ecosystem service,172 and similar programs173
 
 170. As forest certification markets expand, demand should increase for certi-
fied forest products originating from sustainably managed forests.  Forest certifi-
cation markets are especially important because other private forest markets are 
shrinking.  For example, the U.S. pulp and paper industry largely has retreated 
overseas, and large paper companies increasingly are offloading landholdings in 
the United States.  See April Reese, FORESTS: ‘Ecosystem Services’ at Risk from 
Suburban Development, E&E PUBLISHING, LLC (Aug. 19, 2010), 
http://www.eenews.net/public/Landletter/2010/08/19/1.  As foresters seek to tran-
sition timber sales from the pulp and paper industry into sawmill markets, they 
should benefit from an increasing demand for certified sawmill and lumber prod-
ucts. 
 would 
 171. The inclusion of REDD programs into a future forest or climate treaty 
would be wise not only because such programs are voluntary for the partici-
pants—thus avoiding federalism concerns—but also because REDD programs are 
already under consideration for inclusion in a global treaty.  In fact, the Rights 
and Resources Initiative has noted that “REDD+ emerged as one of the rare 
points of consensus from the confusion in Copenhagen.”  Rights and Resources 
Initiative, Fourth RRI Dialogue on Forests, Governance, & Climate Change Event 
Announcement (Apr. 6, 2010), available at http://www.rightsandresources.org/ 
documents/files/doc_1424.pdf.  Furthermore, REDD programs perhaps provide the 
most effective method—both practical and economic—of using forests to fight cli-
mate change.  Scholars have noted that carbon sequestration potential of REDD 
projects is multiple times the potential of afforestation and reforestation projects.  
Myers, supra note 6, at 1.  In addition, the IPCC found that “[r]educed deforesta-
tion and degradation is the forest mitigation option with the largest and most 
immediate carbon stock impact in the short term . . . because large carbon  
stocks . . . are not emitted when deforestation is prevented.”  Nabuurs & Masera 
et al., supra note 163, at 550.  Due to the sheer magnitude of carbon that can be 
sequestered under REDD programs, and the corresponding increase in carbon 
credit investments made available by such programs, REDD programs provide 
significant economic incentives for private foresters to participate voluntarily.  In 
fact, the United Kingdom government’s Stern Review on the economics of climate 
change recommended a greater focus on “[c]uts in non-energy emissions, such as 
those resulting from deforestation.”  NICHOLAS H. STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN REVIEW xvii (2007).   
  The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism allows for the gener-
ation of emissions credits for afforestation and reforestation projects but not for 
programs aimed at reducing deforestation and degradation.  Lars H. Gulbrand-
sen, Overlapping Public and Private Governance: Can Forest Certification Fill the 
Gaps in the Global Forest Regime?, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., May 2004, at 75, 81.  A 
shift is occurring, however, as current proposals suggest including REDD in a 
post-Kyoto agreement.  Murray & Olander, supra note 13.  At a REDD workshop 
in Cairns, Australia, in 2007, numerous countries proposed mechanisms for incor-
porating REDD into future climate talks.  Myers, supra note 6, at 18.  Similarly, 
in 2005, Costa Rica and Papua New Guinea submitted a proposal on behalf of the 
Coalition for Rainforest Nations to give developing countries access to the carbon 
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market through credits generated from REDD programs.  Id. at 17–18.  Also, at 
the Bali round of the UNFCCC in December 2007, delegates agreed to the “Bali 
Action Plan,” which was a decision on “[r]educing emissions from deforestation in 
developing countries” that “invited parties to reduce carbon emissions from forest 
degradation ‘on a voluntary basis’ in order to enhance forest carbon stocks in de-
veloping countries.”  Humphreys, supra note 83, at 433–34.  REDD programs 
would also compliment the United States’ ever-developing movement toward a 
carbon cap-and-trade program and, if it eventually occurs, could dovetail nicely 
into a climate change agreement facilitating voluntary landowner participation in 
forest management programs.  The incentives for United States incorporation of 
REDD programs into a national climate policy are clear, as REDD could greatly 
reduce costs of climate change regulation.  One study found that forest carbon, 
sequestered primarily through REDD activities, could “cut the global cost of cli-
mate change policies in half and reduce the price of carbon by 40 percent.”  Myers, 
supra note 6, at 25.  In short, considering the potential value of REDD in reducing 
the cost of climate regulation, the inertia toward including REDD into any global 
treaty aimed at forest management, and U.S. federalism’s effect on U.S. treaty 
participation and implementation, inclusion of REDD programs is clearly war-
ranted. 
 172. Foresters might receive significant payments from ecosystem service pro-
grams.  Scholars note that 
forests provide important and valuable ecosystem services, offering shel-
ter and habitat for a vast array of plant and animal species, purifying 
water, sequestering carbon, and slowing rainfall to prevent flooding.  
Most of these services are “free,” in the sense that they are not captured 
in markets.  As a result, with no obvious economic value they have often 
been ignored in management decisions. 
RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra note 15, at 1206.  As an example, a soil 
stabilization and erosion control project undertaken in Tucson, Arizona, included 
the planting of 500,000 mesquite trees that reduced surface water runoff that 
would otherwise have required the construction of $90,000 worth of detention 
ponds.  DOUGLAS J. KRIEGER, ECONOMIC VALUE OF FOREST ECOSYSTEM SER-
VICES: A REVIEW (2001), reprinted in RASBAND, SALZMAN & SQUILLACE, supra 
note 15, at 1207.  Similarly, forest managers might receive payment for the provi-
sion of air quality services, as urban forest programs seek to remove particulate 
matter from the air through forestry.  The same mesquite trees in Tucson, once 
they reach maturity, will remove 6,500 tons of particulate matter annually.  Id. at 
1208.  Since Tucson spends $1.5 million on an alternative dust control program, 
the air quality value of each tree is significant.  Id.   
  As another example of the value of the forest in this regard, “45 percent of 
the total water runoff in California is estimated to originate on national for- 
ests . . . .  The value of water flowing from national forests, in both offstream and 
instream uses, is conservatively estimated to be at least $3.7 billion per year.”  
FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., 2000 RPA ASSESSMENT OF FOREST AND 
RANGE LANDS 63 (2000), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/pl/rpa/rpaasses.pdf.  In 
short, there is money to be saved, and made, by foresters participating in market-
based ecosystem service programs. 
 173. A thorough description of the operation of these programs is outside the 
scope of this Article.  For background on forest certification programs, see Gul-
brandsen, supra note 171; Graeme Auld, Ben Cashore & Deanna Newsom, Per-
spectives on Forest Certification: A Survey Examining Differences Among the U.S. 
Forest Sectors’ Views of Their Forest Certification Alternatives, in FOREST POLICY 
FOR PRIVATE FORESTRY (Benjamin Cashore, Lawrence Teeter & Daowei eds., 
2003); Andrew Long, Auditing for Sustainable Forest Management: The Role of 
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encourage private foresters to manage forests sustainably, as 
the economic benefits from participating in those markets were 
realized.174
Ultimately, an improved carbon market providing greater 
participation of forest owners in carbon-credit-generating 
REDD-type programs; forest ecosystem service markets captur-
ing watershed, air quality, biodiversity, and other values; and a 
better-developed forest certification market could “fill an in-
creasing void in the portfolios of private forest managers in the 
US and at the same time induce behavioural change in forest 
management that will have a positive environmental im-
pact.”
 
175  Because U.S. federalism “acts as a legal constitution-
al driver for decentralization and the use of bottom-up mechan-
isms,” the international community should promote and 
implement market-based programs that “allow the participa-
tion of a wide range of public, private, international and local 
stakeholders.”176
The use of forest management as a solution to climate 
change is crucial.  To address climate change adequately, and 
to capture the multiple other ecosystem service values provided 
by sustainable forestry, parties in global environmental negoti-
ations must take into account the domestic legal structures of 
key participants when crafting binding treaties aimed at forest 
management.
 
177  Because the United States has been targeted 
both as a key component of successful binding global forest go-
vernance and blamed for the recent failures of treaty forma-
tion,178
 
Science, 31 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006).  For background on ecosystem service 
programs, see Sara J. Scherr & Alejandra Martin eds., Katoomba Workshop II 
Proceedings and Summary of Key Issues: Developing Commercial Markets for 
Environmental Services of Forests (Oct. 4–6, 2000), http://www.forest-
trends.org/~foresttr/documents/files/doc_801.pdf.  See also Alicia Robbins, Discus-
sion Paper, Ecosystem Services Markets (2005), available at 
https://digital.lib.washington.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1773/2244/tp12.pdf?seq
uence=1. For background on REDD programs, see Myers, supra note 
 treaty negotiators must consider the U.S. federalism 
question.  Failure to do so might lead to negotiations support-
ing top-down prescriptive regulations, which would leave the 
6.  Though 
REDD programs heretofore have been aimed at the developing world, REDD pro-
vides a model of the type of market-based mechanisms that could be implemented 
in the United States to avoid federalism issues under a treaty that includes global 
forest management. 
 174. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 16, at 359. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. See supra Part II.B. 
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United States unable to act.  The next part considers U.S. fede-
ralism’s effect on the U.S. government’s treaty power in the 
context of forest management and demonstrates that the high-
ly contentious and unresolved nature of the debate lends fur-
ther support for the conclusions this Article proposes. 
III.  AN UNENDING CONTROVERSY—DOES FEDERALISM LIMIT 
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER? 
The previous parts discussed how climate change offers a 
new opportunity to achieve binding global governance of forests 
and also analyzed the role of the United States as a potential 
federalist veto player.  Regarding the latter, the Article ana-
lyzed the political science driving federalism’s effects on the 
formation of a treaty aimed at forests, the United States’ im-
portance to treaty formation, the potential limiting effects of 
U.S. federalism on treaty creation and domestic implementa-
tion, how international law would view such effects, and how to 
avoid those effects during global forest treaty negotiation.  Dur-
ing the foregoing analysis, however, the Article necessarily 
presumed that federalism would in fact have a limiting effect 
on the treaty power, in order to clearly demonstrate how the 
voluntary, market-based programs proposed here provide a so-
lution for avoiding federalism limitations.  This part turns to 
the resolution of whether federalism does in fact limit the U.S. 
federal government’s treaty power, or more accurately, wheth-
er, based upon scholarly interpretations of constitutional law 
generally and the U.S. Supreme Court case of Missouri vs. Hol-
land specifically, there is likely to be a resolution to this ques-
tion in the foreseeable future. 
This part proceeds in three sections, each of which demon-
strates the high degree of uncertainty surrounding the treaty 
power’s scope and federalism’s potential limits upon it, espe-
cially in the area of forest management.  Section A first details 
the vigorous debate between constitutional law scholars over 
the scope of the treaty power and whether federalism may 
place any limits whatsoever on the United States’ authority to 
pass domestic legislation pursuant to an international treaty.  
This section is an important precursor to delving more deeply 
into Missouri v. Holland, and establishes the context—that is, 
the nationalist vs. new federalist debate—within which Hol-
land is likely to be interpreted going forward.  Section B then 
analyzes Missouri v. Holland in more detail and discusses 
2011] CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, & FEDERALISM 405 
whether, within the context of the broader constitutional de-
bate, potential limitations on the treaty power might arise out 
of that case—thus emanating from the judicial branch of gov-
ernment—or rather out of the executive branch of government, 
as some scholars have asserted.  Finally, Section C presents a 
more focused discussion of the treaty power and its relation-
ship to private property rights, providing valuable insights into 
how courts might rule in favor of challenges to domestic im-
plementation of a treaty dictating forest management on pri-
vate lands. 
A.  Setting the Stage—the Nationalist Versus New 
Federalist Debate 
Constitutional law scholars are sharply divided regarding 
whether federalism places the limits discussed in Part II upon 
the treaty power.  If federalism does not limit the federal gov-
ernment’s treaty power, then it matters little, for domestic im-
plementation purposes, what types of forest policy directives 
are included within a global treaty—whether voluntary, mar-
ket-based, or prescriptive.  If, however, federalism does limit 
the treaty power, then the voluntary, market-based programs 
highlighted in Part II become much more important to ensur-
ing U.S. involvement in a successful global treaty.  Even so, the 
question of the treaty power’s scope in light of potential federal-
ism limitations is anything but certain, lending support to this 
Article’s argument that voluntary, market-based programs are 
currently the safer route to ensuring treaty success. 
During one of the most prominent scholarly skirmishes on 
the scope of the treaty power, which took place in the Michigan 
Law Review at the beginning of the decade, Professor David 
Golove provided an accurate and useful summary of the nature 
of the debate: 
 Characteristic of the most enduring constitutional contro-
versies is a clash between fundamental but ultimately irrec-
oncilable principles.  Unable to synthesize opposing pre-
cepts, we visit and revisit certain issues in an endless cycle.  
Each generation marches forward heedless, and sometimes 
only dimly aware, of how many times the battle has already 
been fought.  Even the peace of exhaustion achieves only a 
temporary respite. 
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 The abiding controversy over the relationship between the 
treaty power of the national government and the legislative 
powers of the states is paradigmatic in this respect. . . .  
[T]he issue has been among the most passionately disputed 
questions in our constitutional history.  Although temporar-
ily in hibernation, it threatens presently to break out again 
into full-blown conflict. 
 Can the federal government enter into treaties on subjects 
that are otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers?179
Golove’s not-so-veiled exasperation with this question was a re-
sponse to an article by Professor Curtis Bradley titled The 
Treaty Power and American Federalism, in which Bradley ar-
gued that the treaty power is not unlimited in scope and could 
be restrained by federalism principles.
 
180  Bradley’s article eva-
luated the nationalist position on the treaty power, which, 
based largely on Missouri v. Holland, rejects both the idea that 
the Tenth Amendment placed any restrictions on the treaty 
power and the notion that there are any subject matter limita-
tions upon the treaty power.181  Bradley “question[ed] the na-
tionalist view,” asserting that the treaty power “is a power to 
make supreme federal law.  If such law can be made on any 
subject, without regard to the rights of the states, then the 
treaty power gives the federal government essentially plenary 
power vis-à-vis the states.  Such plenary power, however, is ex-
actly what American federalism denies.”182
Bradley argued that if federalism means anything under 
past or current understandings of constitutional law—that is, 
the new federalism—then the treaty power should not be given 
 
 
 179. Golove, supra note 21, at 1076–77. 
 180. See generally Bradley I, supra note 19; Bradley II, supra note 19. 
 181. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 393–94 (“The nationalist view has been en-
dorsed by a number of prominent foreign affairs commentators, as well as by the 
influential Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United  
States. . . .  [T]he nationalist view of the treaty power has two components.  First, 
largely on the basis of the Supreme Court’s decision in Missouri v. Holland, it 
generally is understood today that ‘the Tenth Amendment, reserving to the sever-
al States the powers not delegated to the United States, does not limit the power 
to make treaties or other agreements.’  Second, while it ‘was once widely accepted’ 
that treaties could be made only with respect to matters of ‘international concern,’ 
most commentators today either disagree with such a limitation or assume that it 
is insignificant, given that most matters upon which treaties are likely to be con-
cluded can plausibly be characterized as of international concern.”). 
 182. Id. at 394.  Bradley went further: “we must decide whether federalism is 
worth preserving.  If it is, the nationalist view of the treaty power should be re-
considered.”  Id. at 461. 
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special immunity from federalism limitations.183  Other scho-
lars have made similar arguments.184  Bradley ultimately ar-
gued that the treaty power should be subject to the same feder-
alism limitations that apply to Congress’s legislative powers, 
with the result that “the federal government should not be able 
to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law that could 
not be created by Congress.”185  Swaine agreed, stating that the 
Supreme Court “might adopt the presumption, for example, 
that neither treaties nor their domestic implementation were 
intended to exceed the federal government’s legislative authori-
ty. . . . [A] presumption that treaties ought not be construed in 
excess of otherwise applicable limits on the national govern-
ment’s power . . . has precedent.”186
The new federalism that arose in the 1990s included a 
number of cases where the Supreme Court, for the first time 
since 1937, limited the scope of Congress’s domestic powers and 
correlatively protected states’ rights and the traditional sub-
  Given the new federalism, 
the interpretation that the federal government’s treaty power 
cannot exceed Congress’s authority to legislate pursuant to its 
other constitutional powers would put federal management of 
land use activities like forestry in serious doubt. 
 
 183. Id. at 394.  (“My argument is simply that if federalism is to be the subject 
of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears to believe—there is 
no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection.  
My argument is one against treaty power exceptionalism, not necessarily one in 
favor of federalism.”). 
 184. Swaine, supra note 2, at 474–75 (stating that federalism limits “might 
leave the United States with a gap between its international treaty obligations 
and its ability to implement them, and that gap may be relatively more difficult 
for the government to fill. . . .  If the national government is indeed supposed to be 
a creature of limited authority, shouldn’t the treaty power enjoy boundaries just 
like any other?”); see also Fischer, supra note 19; Rosenkranz, supra note 19; Hol-
lis, supra note 19. 
 185. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 450.  See also id. at 456 (“Another option for 
protecting federalism . . . would be to subject the treaty power to the same federal-
ism restrictions that apply to Congress’s legislative powers.  Under this approach, 
the treaty power would not confer any additional regulatory powers on the federal 
government, just the power to bind the United States on the international plane.  
Thus, for example, it could not be used to resurrect legislation determined by the 
Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s legislative powers, such as the legislation 
at issue in the recent New York, Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions.  As men-
tioned above, this approach was endorsed by George Nicholas during the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, Thomas Jefferson in his Manual on Parliamentary Prac-
tice, and the Supreme Court in its 1836 decision, New Orleans v. United States.  It 
also is essentially the law in Canada, where the treaty power has been construed 
not to give the national government legislative power over matters reserved to the 
provinces.”). 
 186. Swaine, supra note 2, at 422. 
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jects of state regulatory authority under the Tenth Amend-
ment.187  The Supreme Court invoked federalism principles to 
strike down federal statutes in New York v. United States,188 
United States v. Lopez,189 City of Boerne v. Flores,190 Printz v. 
United States,191 and United States v. Morrison.192  In New 
York, the Court found the statute invalid because it was “in-
consistent with the federal structure of our Government estab-
lished by the Constitution,”193 while in Printz the Court found 
the statute invalid because it “compromise[d] the structural 
framework of dual sovereignty.”194
 
 187. Rosenkranz, supra note 
  Furthermore, in the Court’s 
19, at 1936. 
 188. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal 
statute that effectively compelled state disposal of radioactive waste). 
 189. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (invalidating a federal 
statute criminalizing the possession of firearms near school zones). 
 190. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (invalidating a federal 
statute for exceeding Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 191. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating a federal 
statute requiring state law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on 
handgun purchasers). 
 192. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (invalidating a federal 
statute providing a civil remedy to victims of gender-based violence, even when no 
criminal charges were filed). 
 193. 505 U.S. at 177. 
 194. 521 U.S. at 932.  Bradley noted that “[i]t was obvious by [Printz] that the 
Court was treating the Tenth Amendment (broadly defined) as a restraint on de-
legated powers.  Indeed, two concurring justices, including the author of the earli-
er New York decision, stated this expressly.”  Bradley II, supra note 19, at 115.  
Another scholar has noted about Printz: 
  The Court[ ] . . . asked whether the Act was consistent with the struc-
ture of the Constitution.  In this section, the Court discussed the nature 
of federalism and emphasized the “residuary and inviolable sovereignty” 
of the states.  This sovereignty, the Court asserted, is implicit in numer-
ous provisions of the Constitution and explicit in the Tenth Amendment.  
The Court did not focus on the scope of the Commerce Clause to deter-
mine where federal power began and state sovereignty ended.  Instead, it 
inferred a zone of state sovereignty based on the constitutional provi-
sions cited by Justice Scalia and on the Framers’ intent.  “The Framers 
explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to 
regulate individuals, not States.”  The Court also rejected the federal 
government’s contention that Congress’s power to regulate handguns 
under the Commerce Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, established the Brady Act’s constitutionality.  “When a ‘La[w] . . . 
for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle 
of state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we 
mentioned earlier . . . it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Ex-
ecution the Commerce Clause . . . .’ ” 
  Here again, it is difficult to see how the Court’s conclusion would 
change if the Brady Act were based on a treaty.  Unlike in New York, the 
Court did not base its conclusion on the boundaries of the Commerce 
Clause.  So one cannot say that while the commerce power extends to 
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subsequent unanimous decision in Reno v. Condon, the Court 
stated that “[i]n New York and Printz, we held federal statutes 
invalid, not because Congress lacked legislative authority over 
the subject matter, but because those statutes violated the 
principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amend-
ment.”195
Though this shift in the Supreme Court’s perspective on 
domestic federal authority might seem to be a victory for those 
supporting federalism principles, Bradley warned that the Su-
preme Court’s reassertion of federalism protections “is likely to 
increase the importance of the scope of the treaty power.  If the 
treaty power is immune from federalism restrictions, as the na-
tionalist view maintains, then it may be a vehicle for the 
enactment of legislative changes that fall outside of Congress’s 
domestic lawmaking powers.”
 
196  Once again, Swaine agreed, 
stating that “[t]he new federalism decisions also invite fresh 
scrutiny of the treaty power by encouraging its creative use to 
circumvent federalism restrictions.”197  Swaine cited scholars 
arguing that the statutes struck down in City of Boerne and 
Morrison could (and should) effectively be reenacted if legis-
lated pursuant to an international treaty.198
 
point A, the treaty power might extend further to point B.  Instead, the 
Court independently identifies point X—the line of state sovereignty—
and declares that federal action past this point is impermissible.  One 
might suggest that the Court would move point X for prudential reasons 
if the treaty power were invoked, but there is no indication of such flex-
ibility in the Court’s opinion.  Indeed, it declares that protecting state 
sovereignty is essential to preserving liberty.  It would seem difficult for 
the Court to surrender that sovereignty simply because Congress was 
clever enough to package the Brady Act in a treaty. 
  Both the CWA 
and the ESA have received similar attention, as scholars have 
asserted that potential “as applied” constitutional challenges to 
these acts could be rendered moot if the resources in question 
Thomas Healy, Note, Is Missouri v. Holland Still Good Law? Federalism and the 
Treaty Power, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1726, 1739–40 (1998) (alterations to quotations 
in original) (quoting Printz, 521 U.S. at 919, 920, 923–24). 
 195. Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000). 
 196. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 400. 
 197. Swaine, supra note 2, at 417. 
 198. Id.  See also Bradley II, supra note 19, at 100 (“[A] group of international 
law scholars filed an amicus curiae brief arguing that, even if the statute exceeded 
Congress’s powers (as the Supreme Court ultimately concluded), it should be 
upheld as a valid implementation of a treaty.”) (citing Brief of Amici Curiae on 
Behalf of International Law Scholars and Human Rights Experts in Support of 
Petitioners at 28–30, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-
0005, 99-0029)). 
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were protected pursuant to an international treaty.199  None-
theless, “[b]ecause such arguments rely on an apparent incon-
sistency between Holland and the new federalism, they argua-
bly increase its vulnerability to being reinterpreted, narrowed, 
or overruled.”200
Professor Katrina Kuh framed the balance between the 
new federalism and the treaty power more directly and as-
sessed “how the treaty power will be recast in a manner consis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s revitalized approach to federal-
ism.”
 
201  Kuh stated that the nationalist view of the treaty 
power as unlimited in scope “ignores both historical uncertain-
ty about the bounds of the treaty power as well as new legal 
scholarship questioning the continued vitality of strong ver-
sions of the treaty power in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
federalism jurisprudence.”202  Kuh argued that the holding in 
Missouri v. Holland, to the extent that the nationalist camp in-
terpreted it as immunizing the treaty power from the con-
straints of the Tenth Amendment, may be called into question 
given the new federalism jurisprudence of the Court.203  She 
ultimately concluded that “as scholars undertake critical ex-
aminations of the treaty power, they will generally agree that 
some type of limitation on the treaty power is imminent and/or 
warranted . . . . [A]rticulation of a limitation on the nationalist 
view of the treaty power is both inevitable and advisable.”204
Golove responded rather forcefully to what he viewed as 
misguided new federalism reinterpretations of the nationalist 
 
 
 199. Fischer, supra note 19, at 173–74 (“Although the Supreme Court did not 
reach the issue, commentators on the SWANCC decision have suggested that the 
treaty power provides a ground independent of the Commerce Clause for uphold-
ing the constitutionality of the CWA’s reach to include isolated, intrastate water 
bodies.  Gavin R. Villareal and Omar N. White have evaluated (in separate ar-
ticles) the possibility of employing the treaty power to support the ESA.”) (citing 
Stephen M. Johnson, Federal Regulation of Isolated Wetlands After SWANCC, 
[June 2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,669; Gavin R. Villareal, Note, 
One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congressional Authority for the En-
dangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1125 (1998); 
Omar N. White, The Endangered Species Act’s Precarious Perch: A Constitutional 
Analysis Under the Commerce Clause and the Treaty Power, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 215 
(2000)). 
 200. Swaine, supra note 2, at 417. 
 201. Fischer, supra note 19, at 175.  Professor Kuh was known as Professor 
Fischer at the time this Article was written. 
 202. Id. at 177. 
 203. Id. at 180. 
 204. Id. at 180–81. 
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perspective on the treaty power.205  In Golove’s view, the ques-
tion was simply a matter of whether the treaty power was an 
independently granted “delegated” power to the national gov-
ernment, taking it outside any restrictions generated by the 
Tenth Amendment.206  Golove answered in the affirmative.  
Furthermore, Golove took issue with Bradley’s interpretation 
of the constitutional history relied upon by the nationalist 
camp, asserted that Bradley’s view was “entirely unwar-
ranted,” and argued that it is actually “the states’ rights view 
that must stretch for historical validation.”207  The tense dis-
connect between the two camps was apparent as Golove ac-
cused Bradley of ignoring contrary precedents and found Brad-
ley’s approach “particularly inadequate” and “entirely without 
support in the Constitution.”208  Golove also found “unpersua-
sive” Bradley’s contention that the treaty power would be vir-
tually unlimited without federalism restraints.209
Bradley counterpunched even more forcefully, describing 
portions of Golove’s analysis as “polemical and exaggerated in 
tone and substance.”
 
210  Bradley claimed that Golove inhibited 
debate on the scope of the treaty power by “largely fail[ing] to 
engage” his critique.211  Also, Bradley stated that Golove’s 
analysis “reflects a false assumption about the views of other 
foreign affairs scholars” and that it “more importantly, lacks 
any meaningful content.”212
 
 205. Golove, supra note 
  Bradley asserted that Golove, 
while purportedly accepting the new federalism, provided anal-
ysis that is “inconsistent” with the decisions upon which new 
21, at 1079 (“Given a seven-to-two decision rendered 
by a Court well known for its sensitivity to federalism concerns—a decision that 
has been on the books for eighty years, repeatedly reaffirmed and never ques-
tioned by the Court, and the object of a highly publicized but failed effort to 
amend the Constitution—it is difficult to see what justification there could be now 
for overruling such a venerable decision.  Yet, that is precisely what Professor 
Curtis Bradley forcefully advocated in Treaty Power and American Federalism, 
recently published in this Review.”). 
 206. Id. at 1087–88.  (“Under this view—the nationalist view—the treaty pow-
er is the same as any of the other enumerated powers, except that it is granted to 
the President and Senate in Article II, rather than to Congress in Article I.  In 
contrast, the states’ rights view, at least in its most plausible formulation, denies 
that the treaty power is, in the relevant sense, ‘delegated.’  Rather, it is just 
another method for exercising the powers given to the national government in Ar-
ticle I.”). 
 207. Id. at 1278. 
 208. Id. at 1278–79. 
 209. Id. at 1287. 
 210. Bradley II, supra note 19, at 98. 
 211. Id. at 99. 
 212. Id. 
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federalism is based.213  Finally, Bradley was particularly criti-
cal of Golove’s historical analysis, finding it to be “methodologi-
cally inconsistent and tendentious.”214  Even more pointedly, 
Bradley asserted that “[a] central complaint about the use of 
history by legal academics (and judges) is that it is shaped and 
twisted in order to support a particular conclusion.  It is in this 
sense that, notwithstanding its length, Golove’s historical dis-
cussion may be considered law office history.”215
Ultimately, this scholarly skirmish demonstrates—at the 
very least—that the issue of whether federalism places limits 
on the treaty power is highly contentious among prominent 
scholars and is as of yet unresolved.  As Bradley stated, 
 
 The scope of the treaty power has been debated numerous 
times throughout this nation’s history.  The issue has resur-
faced in recent years for a number of reasons, including the 
Supreme Court’s revitalization of federalism restraints in 
the domestic arena and an expansion in the scope and range 
of U.S. treatymaking. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . Golove’s article fails to appreciate the legitimate reasons 
why the treaty power question has been a persistent feature 
of American political and legal discourse, and why, in this 
age of globalization, the question once again merits our at-
tention.216
This constitutional uncertainty alone is arguably enough to 
discourage the United States from supporting, at least at the 
present, a forest management treaty that would raise such de-
batable federalism concerns.  The next section, however, turns 
to Missouri v. Holland, assesses it in the context of the recent 
scholarly debates on the scope of the treaty power, and analyz-
es where land use activities, like forest management, fall along 
the spectrum of the treaty power’s scope.  The next section also 
analyzes an alternative treaty power limitation put forth by 
Professor Duncan Hollis, arising out of the executive branch, 
 
 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id.  Notably, Bradley argued that Golove “overstates the degree to which 
Supreme Court precedent resolved the treaty power issue prior to Holland.  Most 
of the decisions Golove cites as ‘affirming the nationalist view’ simply held that 
valid treaties preempt inconsistent state law.”  Id. at 130. 
 215. Id. at 124. 
 216. Id. at 132–33. 
2011] CLIMATE CHANGE, FORESTS, & FEDERALISM 413 
which could complicate forest treaty formation even if the judi-
ciary ultimately refuses to revisit Missouri v. Holland. 
B.  Missouri v. Holland—Death by Judicial Review or 
Executive Federalism? 
Scholars have described Missouri v. Holland as the 
“benchmark” for the Treaty Clause authority of the federal 
government to regulate certain natural resources217 and “per-
haps the most famous and most discussed case in the constitu-
tional law of foreign affairs.”218  Importantly, scholars have ob-
served that Holland “is in deep tension with the fundamental 
constitutional principle of enumerated legislative powers, and 
it is therefore of enormous theoretical importance.”219
The events giving rise to Holland arose out of a December 
8, 1916, treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
recognizing that “many species of birds in their annual migra-
tions traversed many parts of the United States and of Canada 
. . . were of great value as a source of food and in destroying in-
sects injurious to vegetation, but were in danger of exterminat-
ion through lack of adequate protection.”
  The fol-
lowing review of Holland is not meant to resolve the constitu-
tional questions presented but rather to demonstrate that the 
debatable nature of the case’s precedential value for forest reg-
ulation creates even more uncertainty regarding federalism’s 
potential limits on the treaty power—thus advancing this Ar-
ticle’s argument that such federalism complications should be 
avoided during current negotiations on forests. 
220  The two countries 
agreed to pass domestic conservation legislation to implement 
the treaty.221  To that end, the United States passed the Migra-
tory Bird Treaty Act (“MBTA”) to prohibit the killing, captur-
ing, or selling of any migratory birds covered by the treaty.222  
The State of Missouri challenged a U.S. game warden’s author-
ity to enforce the MBTA, arguing the act was unconstitutional 
as an interference with the rights reserved to the states under 
the Tenth Amendment.223
 
 217. LAITOS ET AL., supra note 
  Missouri also asserted the tradition 
123, at 1200–01. 
 218. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
190 (2d ed. 1996). 
 219. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1869. 
 220. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 430–31. 
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of state control over wildlife to support its claim.224  In re-
sponse, the federal government argued the statute was valid 
under the treaty-making power granted to it by the Constitu-
tion.225
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that Ar-
ticle II of the Constitution expressly delegates authority to the 
federal government to create treaties.
 
226  Furthermore, the 
Court noted that Article VI declares that treaties are made un-
der the “authority of the United States” and that federal laws 
passed under the Constitution are the supreme law of the 
land.227  The Court found that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can 
be no dispute about the validity of the [MBTA] under Article I, 
§ 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of 
the Government.”228  The Court found that the MBTA did not 
contravene any specific portion of the Constitution, and thus 
was valid—unless it was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment 
under the facts of the case.229  The Court stated that “[t]he lan-
guage of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being 
general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into 
the ground upon which the present supposed exception is 
placed,”230 and that “[n]o doubt the great body of private rela-
tions usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty 
may override its power . . . . [I]t only remains to consider the 
application of established rules to the present case.”231
Scholars have largely assumed that the Court’s analysis 
stopped at a review of the “treaty power.”
 
232
 
 224. Id. at 431. 
  If so, this fact 
 225. Id. at 424. 
 226. Id. at 432. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 433–34. 
 230. Id. at 432. 
 231. Id. at 434–35. 
 232. See Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1885–88 (“The treaty power is some-
what analogous, textually and structurally, to the legislative power vested in the 
Congress by Article I, Section I.  Textually, the phrase ‘legislative Powers’ in Ar-
ticle I may be paraphrased as the ‘power to make laws,’ which is parallel to the 
Article II ‘Power . . . to make Treaties.’  Structurally, both powers may be used to 
create ‘supreme Law of the Land.’  And if the legislative power is analogous to the 
treaty power, then a statute is analogous to a treaty.  A statute, like a treaty, is 
not itself a ‘Power[ ] vested by th[e] Constitution’; rather, like a treaty, it is the 
fruit of the exercise of one such power—in this case, the legislative power vested 
in the Congress by Article I, Section 1.  Yet it has never been suggested that be-
cause Congress has power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution the ‘legislative Powers’ of Article I, Section I, it thus 
has power to make laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
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would support the U.S. government’s authority to enter into an 
international agreement imposing domestic restrictions on for-
est management practices on private lands.  However, the 
Court’s subsequent Tenth Amendment analysis, as applied to 
the specific facts of Holland, makes this assertion less clear, es-
pecially when the resource in question is private forestlands.233  
For example, the Court noted that “[w]ild birds are not the pos-
session of anyone . . . [t]he whole foundation of the State’s 
rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that yes-
terday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and 
in a week a thousand miles away.”234
 
fruits of the exercise of such powers, which is to say, other statutes. . . .  Yet this is 
precisely analogous to the implicit logic of Missouri v. Holland.  Justice Holmes 
and the few scholars to have considered the question have implicitly assumed that 
a law implementing a non-self-executing treaty that has already been made would 
somehow fit the bill as a ‘Law[ ] which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution . . . [the] Power . . . to make Treaties.’  The error stems, perhaps, 
from a failure to quote the relevant clauses.  Or perhaps it stems from the coinci-
dental echo of the word ‘execution’ in the Necessary and Proper Clause and in the 
doctrine of non-self-executing treaties.  At any rate, as noted at the outset of this 
Article, Justice Holmes contented himself with just a single conclusory sentence: 
‘If the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute un-
der Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the 
Government.’ ”) (alterations in original) (quoting various authorities). 
  Thus, the migratory na-
ture of the resource weakened the state’s claim of sole regulato-
ry authority over them.  In other words, because the MBTA in-
volved a resource that moved across international boundaries, 
Congress could enter into a treaty to regulate the resource 
 233. Importantly, the Court stated: 
We do not mean to imply that there are no qualifications to the treaty-
making power; but they must be ascertained in a different way.  It is ob-
vious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the national 
well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty 
followed by such an act could . . . . 
Holland, 252 U.S. at 433.  In addition, it is unclear that the Court today even 
would consider the facts of Holland under the treaty-making power:  “[S]ince 1937 
the Supreme Court’s broad reading of the Commerce Clause as a source of con-
gressional power has led to more reliance upon it to uphold federal regulation of 
wildlife.”  GEORGE C. COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES 
LAW 178 (6th ed. 2007).  In fact, the MBTA itself subsequently was justified inde-
pendently under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 
(1979).  An assessment of whether the federal government could regulate forests 
pursuant to Commerce Clause authority is outside the scope of this Article.  
Though Gonzales v. Raich potentially “suggests that Lopez and Morrison did not 
entirely supplant the Court’s earlier view of a broad commerce power,” Hollis, su-
pra note 19, at 1359, it does not prove that new federalism will be eroded signifi-
cantly in the near future. 
 234. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
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without violating the “general terms of the Tenth Amend-
ment.”235
The Court also invoked the national interest at stake as 
support for finding no Tenth Amendment restraint on the fed-
eral government’s legislative authority: 
 
Here a national interest of very nearly first magnitude is 
involved.  It can be protected only by national action in con-
cert with that of another power.  The subject matter is only 
transitorily within the State and has no permanent habitat 
therein.  But for the treaty and the statute there soon might 
be no birds for any powers to deal with.  We see nothing in 
the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by 
while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our for-
ests and our crops are destroyed.  It is not sufficient to rely 
upon the States.  The reliance is in vain, and were it other-
wise, the question is whether the United States is forbidden 
to act.236
It is unclear whether it is “sufficient to rely upon the 
States” to regulate forest management properly.
 
237  On the 
other hand, it does seem clear that climate change is a “nation-
al interest of very nearly the first magnitude,” which can be 
addressed only “by national action in concert with that of 
another power.”238
 
 235. Hudson & Weinthal, supra note 
  As noted, however, the Court in Holland 
primarily relied on the migratory nature of the birds and the 
16, at 360. 
 236. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435. 
 237. Indeed, state governments are likely to exercise less stringent environ-
mental controls over forest management activities on state-owned and private fo-
rests than those the federal government exercises over federal forests.  Scholars 
have noted that “federal officials consistently exhibit greater levels of ecosystem-
level management, rare species identification and protection, ecosystem research 
and monitoring, and soil and watershed improvement” than do state officials, and 
“agency officials at higher levels of government are likely to favor goals other than 
economic development more than are agency officials at lower levels of gover-
nance.”  TOMAS M. KOONTZ, FEDERALISM IN THE FOREST: NATIONAL VERSUS 
STATE NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY 77–78 (2002).  Indeed, in the United States, 
most states maintain forest management standards based on voluntary best man-
agement practices, rather than prescriptive regulation.  Rose with MacCleery et 
al., supra note 4, at 238.  This leaves federal regulation of endangered species and 
water quality under the ESA and CWA as the only check on private forest man-
agement activities.  In other words, “[a]ll private forests are governed by laws re-
lating to the protection of water quality, wetlands and endangered species; but 
private forest owners’ objectives guide management for other values.”  Id. 
 238. Holland, 252 U.S. at 435.  This statement arguably does not apply, how-
ever, regarding forest management in isolation from the climate issue.  It seems 
clear that the United States could manage its forests responsibly and sustainably 
without reliance on the cooperation of any other nation. 
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lack of “possession” by any party.  Furthermore, there is no 
question that the federal government historically has regulated 
wildlife, so that general invocation of the Tenth Amendment by 
states in Holland could not overcome the federal government’s 
treaty authority to regulate that particular resource.239
Additionally, the history of state control over private forest 
management (and land use generally) demonstrates that the 
federal government customarily has not been considered a ne-
cessary party to private forest management—and forests are 
not “protected only by national action in concert with that of 
another power”—even if the federal government is a necessary 
party to climate change negotiations.  These facts, coupled with 
the reassertion of federalism protections by the Court, may ar-
gue against the domestic validity of an international treaty re-
gulating private forest management and for the invocation of a 
Tenth Amendment power reserved to the states, and they could 
prohibit a Holland-type ruling on challenges to an internation-
al forest management treaty. 
  This is 
a very different scenario from private forest management, 
which, as discussed above, traditionally has been considered a 
“land use” regulatory responsibility reserved to states.  Forests 
are indeed “in [the] possession” of specific public and private 
landowners and are obviously not migratory. 
In fact, Professor Edward Swaine, noting Justice Holmes’s 
reliance in Holland on the national interest at stake, the need 
for international cooperation, and the inability of states to re-
gulate the resource in their own right, asserted that “Holland . 
. . instances an interpretative presumption for the treaty pow-
er—we should prefer interpretations permitting U.S. federal-
ism to be reconciled with the national government’s ability to 
negotiate and adhere to treaties—based on the insight that the 
state-based alternative to the treaty power is inadequate.”240  
In the case of forest management, it is politically arguable, but 
legally unclear, that the state-based alternative is inade-
quate—especially considered in light of the new federalism.241
 
 239. In Palila v. Hawaii Dep’t of Land & Natural Res., 471 F. Supp. 985, 992–
93 (D. Haw. 1979), the court characterized the holding in Holland as the authority 
of “the federal government [to] preempt state control over wildlife under federal 
legislation implementing a . . . [t]reaty” (emphasis added). 
  
The Court reasserted federalism protections in Lopez and Mor-
rison in part because the Court “perceived that dual federalism 
 240. Swaine, supra note 2, at 479. 
 241. See supra note 237. 
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required that some matters be left to the states—and, implicit-
ly but unmistakably, that the states were capable of regulating 
the matters in question.”242  Thus the Court indicated that 
“traditional exercise of state authority . . . was worth respecting 
not only for tradition’s sake, but also because it demonstrated 
that the states could take over precisely where the national 
government was forced to stop.”243
Ultimately, a reading of Holland that comports with the 
nationalist view of the treaty power may, as noted by Professor 
Rosenkranz, “run[] counter to the textual and structural logic 
of the Constitution” and could result in Congress’s legislative 
power being “expandable virtually without limit.”
 
244  Rosen-
kranz finds such a scenario “in deep tension with the basic con-
stitutional scheme of enumerated legislative powers, and it 
stands contradicted by countless canonical statements that the 
powers of Congress are fixed and defined.”245  Such an expan-
sion of Congress’s legislative power is not, Rosenkranz argues, 
“consistent with the text of the Constitution or with its under-
lying theory of separation of powers.”246  Rosenkranz is espe-
cially critical of the Holland Court’s failure to cite a particular-
ly germane 1836 Supreme Court decision—Mayor of New 
Orleans v. United States—recognizing the principle that “the 
government of the United States . . . is one of limited powers.  
It can exercise authority over no subjects, except those which 
have been delegated to it.  Congress cannot, by legislation, en-
large the federal jurisdiction, nor can it be enlarged under the 
treaty-making power.”247
 
 242. Swaine, supra note 
  As demonstrated in the next section, 
New Orleans is all the more relevant to an analysis of any trea-
ty regulating land uses like forest management, as the treaty 
2, at 479. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1893. 
 245. Id. at 1894.  Rosenkranz continued: 
Just recently, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that “Con-
gress’ regulatory authority is not without effective bounds.”  But it was 
Chief Justice Marshall, almost two centuries before, who explained why 
in the clearest terms: “enumeration presupposes something not enume-
rated,” or more emphatically, “[t]he powers of the legislature are defined, 
and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the 
constitution is written.” 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608 
(2000); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 195 (1824); Marbury v. Madison, 5 
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)). 
 246. Id. at 1899. 
 247. Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662, 736 (1836). 
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at issue in that case sought to impede traditional state control 
over property rights. 
The Holland Court’s Tenth Amendment analysis may be 
limited to the specific fact pattern of Holland, resting upon the 
Court’s characterization of the birds as being wildlife of a mi-
gratory nature and the necessity of countries collaborating for 
the management of transboundary resources.  Scholars have 
asserted as much, with Bradley noting that “although Holland 
has been construed as giving the treaty power complete im-
munity from federalism limitations, the decision itself can be 
read much more narrowly,”248 and Swaine arguing that “there 
is a substantial risk that subject-matter limitations . . . [may 
be] applied to the exercise of the treaty power.  While Missouri 
v. Holland may survive for the foreseeable future, it will likely 
be read narrowly.”249
[T]he expansive, nationalist view of the treaty power is un-
likely to survive sustained analysis intact and will likely be 
cabined by some type of limiting principle.  When presented 
with arguments that the treaty power justifies congression-
al power to act in an area outside of the bounds of the 
Commerce Clause and other enumerated powers, the Su-
preme Court will be forced to reexamine in a serious way, 
for the first time in nearly eighty years, an ill-defined, poor-
ly understood constitutional doctrine (the nationalist view), 
the wholesale adoption of which could easily be argued to 
undermine the concept of enumerated powers so recently 
embraced by the Court in its Commerce Clause, Eleventh 
Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and anti-commandeering 
decisions.  It only seems prudent to anticipate that instead 
of feeling inexorably bound by relatively moribund 
precedent, the Court will instead endeavor to assimilate the 
treaty power into the revived federalism that it has put for-
ward with such frequency.
  Or, as summarized by Kuh: 
250
Rosenkranz is even more direct, stating that “Missouri v. 
Holland may be canonical, but it does not present a strong case 
for the application of stare decisis.  It is wrongly decided, and it 
should be overruled.”
 
251
Not every scholar who asserts likely federalism limits on 
the treaty power believes such limits will arise out of the judi-
 
 
 248. Bradley I, supra note 19, at 459. 
 249. Swaine, supra note 2, at 412. 
 250. Fischer, supra note 19, at 186. 
 251. Rosenkranz, supra note 19, at 1937. 
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ciary.  Hollis, for instance, does not believe that the Supreme 
Court will revisit Holland anytime soon.252  Although agreeing 
that federalism restraints likely will be placed on the treaty 
power, Hollis asserted that these limitations will arise out of 
the executive branch, rather than the judiciary.253  Hollis 
claimed that both nationalists and new federalists are fixated 
misguidedly on Holland—nationalists believing Holland 
rightly held there were no federalism restraints on the treaty 
power, and new federalists seeking to justify overturning Hol-
land or “dramatically restricting its scope.”254  Hollis cited var-
ious rationales supporting his conclusion,255 but his primary 
rationale was that the executive’s protection of federalism prin-
ciples may prevent the Court from ever having a chance to re-
visit Holland.256
[t]he executive, in exercising its Article II power, has consis-
tently held the reins on accepting U.S. treaty obligations[;] 
 . . . it is ultimately the executive that negotiates and con-
cludes U.S. treaties and determines the scope of the obliga-
tions it wishes to assume.  Thus, it is the executive’s choice, 
first and foremost, whether to defer to federalism in treaty-
making.  Of late, it has done so with increasing frequency.  
As such, the Court may never have a chance to revisit Mis-
souri.  The treaties the president concludes today simply do 
not implicate the legal authority questions Holmes had to 
address.
  Hollis noted that 
257
Hollis argued that the executive has adopted at least six dis-
tinct approaches to federalism during treaty-making: (1) no ac-
 
 
 252. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1360. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 1344–45. 
 255. Hollis’s first rationale was that a majority of the current Court actually 
supported Holland, as Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Stevens, Thomas, and Souter all 
accept Holland as good law.  Id. at 1353–54.  Hollis’s second rationale is that the 
Court resists judicial review of the treaty power, since the Supreme Court has 
never struck down a treaty for exceeding the scope of the treaty power.  Hollis 
noted that “it would require a dramatic change for the Court to suddenly begin 
policing limits on the treaty power.”  Id. at 1355.  If any subject were “dramatic” 
enough to prompt the Court to address the scope of the treaty power, however, it 
would be property rights.  Given the fundamental and controversial nature of pri-
vate property rights, federal regulation of private property via a forest treaty 
might give rise to Fifth Amendment takings claims, which are considered relative-
ly often by the Supreme Court.  Hollis further cited renewed deference to foreign 
affairs power and broader conceptions of Congress’s legislative power as reasons 
the Court is unlikely to revisit Holland.  Id. at 1352–53. 
 256. Id. at 1360. 
 257. Id. 
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commodation at all (either when federalism is not an issue or 
on matters involving foreign persons or transnational con-
duct),258 (2) rejecting the treaty,259 (3) modifying the treaty to 
account for federalism,260 (4) modifying U.S. consent to the 
treaty,261 (5) limiting federal implementation of the treaty,262 
and (6) limiting federal enforcement of the treaty.263
Hollis observed that the executive increasingly has imple-
mented federalism restraints during U.S. treaty-making, and 
has “limited treaties from expanding federal law-making 
beyond Congress’s legislative powers or interfering with activi-
ties traditionally regulated by the states.”
 
264  Hollis agreed 
with other scholars265
may prevent the United States from joining treaties it 
might otherwise have an interest in joining.  It may restrain 
the United States from obtaining concessions from other na-
tions with regard to their behavior because of the knowledge 
that the United States would not be able to reciprocate giv-
en states’ rights concerns.
 that federalism’s potential restraining 
effect on the treaty power may limit the United States’ ability 
to engage successfully in treaty-making, noting that Executive 
Federalism  
266
 
 258. Id. at 1371–72. 
   
 259. Examples include the Convention on the Rights of the Child, see supra 
note 137 (because of its focus on issues that were exclusively the purview of the 
state), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
Hollis, supra note 19, at 1372–73. 
 260. For example, Hollis noted that the Tobacco Convention originally would 
have required the federal government to force states to promote measures to pro-
tect the public from the harms of tobacco smoke, but due to federalism concerns it 
ultimately only imposed those requirements on the federal government “in areas 
of existing national jurisdiction as determined by national law” while “actively 
promot[ing it] at other jurisdictional levels.”  Hollis, supra note 19, at 1377.  Simi-
larly, the Council of European Corruption Convention implicated state criminal 
law, but the executive negotiated explanatory language providing that “it was the 
intention of the drafters of the Convention that [c]ontracting parties assume obli-
gations under this Convention only to the extent consistent with their 
[c]onstitution and the fundamental principles of their legal system, including, 
where appropriate, the principles of federalism.”  Id. at 1378 (alterations in origi-
nal). 
 261. Id. at 1378–81. 
 262. Id. at 1382–84. 
 263. Id. at 1384–86. 
 264. Id. at 1363. 
 265. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text. 
 266. Hollis, supra note 19, at 1394–95. 
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Importantly, Hollis concluded that “even if the Court somehow 
reengages the issue, Executive Federalism offers evidence of 
treaty power limits from the power-holder’s perspective—limits 
to which the Court is likely to defer.”267
Ultimately, regardless of whether the judiciary narrows or 
overrules Holland, or the executive places its own federalism 
restraints on the treaty power, the potential complications for a 
forest treaty that fails to take into account U.S. federalism are 
significant.  The next section concludes this review of federal-
ism and the treaty power by demonstrating that even the na-
tionalist view, as put forth by Golove, may allow for federalism 
restraints on the treaty power in the area of land use activities 
and property rights, such as those at issue in forest manage-
ment activities—creating even more uncertainty and further 
supporting a global treaty that incorporates voluntary mechan-
isms for forest management, rather than prescriptive man-
dates. 
 
C.  The Treaty Power and Private Property Rights 
[N]either life nor property of any citizen, nor the particular 
right of any state, can be affected by a treaty. 
—Edmond Randolph268
The treaty power’s relationship with private property 
rights provides yet another example of the uncertainty sur-
rounding the treaty power’s scope and federalism’s potential 
limits upon it.  Even under the broad, nationalist reading of 
Holland, direct regulation of private property rights and land 
use activities, like forest management, may be outside the 
scope of the treaty power.  Both Bradley and Golove, though on 
opposite ends of the debate, have indicated as much, and fed-
eralism-based protection of private property rights from an en-
croaching treaty power has deep historical roots.  Bradley cited 
an 1819 opinion of the Attorney General that suggested a limi-
tation on the treaty power in the area of private property 
rights.
 
269
 
 267. Id. at 1386. 
  The opinion stated that “the federal government 
could not alter by treaty state inheritance law concerning real 
 268. The Debates in The Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia, re-
printed in 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 504 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1888). 
 269. 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 275 (1819). 
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property.”270  Similarly, in Mayor of New Orleans v. United 
States, the issue was whether, pursuant to a treaty with 
France, the federal government had acquired trust rights over 
certain properties in the City of New Orleans, or whether those 
property rights remained in the local government.271  The 
Court ruled in favor of the city, finding, as noted above, that 
the federal government “is one of limited powers,” and its pow-
er cannot be “enlarged under the treaty-making power,” thus 
suggesting a federalism limitation on the treaty power in the 
area of property rights.272
Furthermore, it was not only the judicial branch of gov-
ernment that asserted federalism limitations on the treaty 
power in the area of property rights.  Ralston Hayden, an early 
twentieth-century scholar who wrote extensively on the treaty 
power and states’ rights, noted that between 1830 and 1860 
“the Senate and the executive entertained grave and increasing 
doubts concerning their authority to make treaties” in the area 
of real property rights and that “in every particular instance in 
which conflict arose the treaty in question was amended to 
bring it more nearly into accord with the states’ rights 
theory.”
 
273
Though Golove’s analysis of property rights as a states’ 
rights limit on the treaty power is rather disjointed, upon clos-
er review it arguably supports federalism as a restraint on the 
treaty power in the area of property rights.  Golove consistently 
cited treaties the United States entered into that limited state 
authority over property rights as foolproof examples of how the 
treaty power can trump powers traditionally left to the 
states.
 
274
 
 270. Bradley I, supra note 
  Yet Golove’s examples may not prove as much as he 
would prefer.  Every example Golove cited dealt with property 
owned by foreign nationals.  For example, Golove asked “[c]an 
the federal government enter into treaties on subjects that are 
otherwise beyond Congress’s legislative powers?  Consider 
some typical examples from the nation’s past: treaty stipula-
19, at 416. 
 271. 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836). 
 272. Id. at 736. 
 273. Ralston Hayden, The States’ Rights Doctrine and the Treaty-Making Pow-
er, 22 AM. HIST. REV. 566, 585 (1917).  In turn, Bradley notes, Hayden “explains 
that, when President Fillmore submitted a proposed treaty between the United 
States and Switzerland to the Senate in 1850, he asked for and obtained amend-
ments from the Senate to protect the reserved powers of the States.”  Bradley I, 
supra note 19, at 421 (citing Hayden, supra, at 575–76). 
 274. See generally Golove, supra note 21; Hollis, supra note 19. 
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tions overriding traditional state laws preventing aliens from 
owning real property . . . .”275  Golove cited another treaty that 
allowed citizens of the United States and citizens of France to 
“own real and personal property in the territory of the other 
and dispose of it by testament, donation, or otherwise to whom-
soever they chose.  This stipulation altered the traditional 
common law rule of the states, which denied aliens the right to 
own real property.”276  Noting the “close relationship between 
real property and state sovereignty,” Golove asserted that “the 
provision was bound to raise questions about the scope of the 
treaty power” and that “this provision, found in the very first 
treaty of the new nation and repeated in countless treaties the-
reafter, raised the single issue over which the states’ rights and 
nationalist views of the treaty power would most recurrently 
contend for the next century and a half”277
Indeed, Golove spent a remarkable amount of time discuss-
ing various treaties that trumped state regulatory authority 
over property rights—but in each case, the treaty only trumped 
state property rights authority as it related to aliens owning 
property in the United States.  A treaty power scope that sub-
sumes traditional state authority over property only in the nar-
row circumstances of foreign citizens’ ownership rights is hard-
ly surprising, as it is consistent with Holland’s focus on treaty 
subject matters that necessarily implicate the involvement of 
the federal government—that is, treaties that necessarily in-
volve the participation of, or interaction with, a foreign pow-
er.
—that is, the treaty 
power versus state control over property rights of citizens of 
other nations. 
278  Given one of the primary justifications for the treaty 
power—the need to speak with one voice in international af-
fairs279
In fact, the Supreme Court holdings that Golove cited 
make clear that the Court only upholds treaty stipulations over 
traditional state authority under circumstances where the 
treaties are “for the protection of citizens of one country resid-
—the federal government would necessarily engage 
with a foreign power over rights of foreign citizens living in the 
United States and would do so constitutionally. 
 
 275. Golove, supra note 21, at 1077. 
 276. Id. at 1106–07. 
 277. Id. at 1107. 
 278. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). 
 279. Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003). 
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ing in the territory of another”280 or are “agreement[s] with re-
spect to the rights and privileges of citizens of the United 
States in foreign countries, and of the nationals of such coun-
tries within the United States.”281
 
 280. Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924). 
  It may be a stretch to assert 
 281. Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 40 (1931).  Golove provided other ex-
amples of treaty power trumping traditional state authority, but each instance, 
again, involved foreign nationals: 
  The Court’s two most notable opinions in the decade following Mis-
souri were Asakura v. City of Seattle and Santovincenzo v. Egan.  At is-
sue in Asakura was a Seattle municipal ordinance regulating pawnbrok-
ers, which restricted applicants to citizens of the United States.  It would 
be hard to imagine a subject more local in character, and the city urged 
the Court to revisit Missouri; the city argued that Missouri was inconsis-
tent with the Tenth Amendment and rendered the treaty power “a con-
venient substitute for legislation in fields over which Congress has no ju-
risdiction.  As this Court knows, a treaty is usually drafted secretly by 
the State Department or commissioners . . . in conference with some for-
eign representative.”  The Court refused the bait.  Instead, Justice But-
ler, speaking for a unanimous Court, made clear that Missouri would be 
taken for all it was worth: 
The treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any 
express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend 
“so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,” it does extend 
to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and 
other nations. . . .  The treaty was made to strengthen friendly rela-
tions between the two nations. . . .  Treaties for the protection of cit-
izens of one country residing in the territory of another are numer-
ous, and make for good understanding between nations.  The treaty 
is binding within the State of Washington. . . .  It stands on the 
same footing of supremacy as do the provisions of the Constitution 
and laws of the United States.  It operates of itself without the aid of 
any legislation, state or national; and it will be applied and given 
authoritative effect by the courts. 
In other words, the only question was whether the treaty was of a com-
mon type and whether it strengthened “friendly relations” and promoted 
“good understanding.”  If so, then no matter how local the subjects with 
which it dealt, it fell within the scope of the treaty power and superseded 
inconsistent state laws. 
  Santovincenzo presented a similar case.  The treaty at issue had a 
novel provision concerning intestate distribution of the estates of dece-
dents of Italian nationality.  Under New York law, in the absence of 
known heirs, the estate escheated to the state.  Under the treaty, howev-
er, the Italian Consul was entitled to receive the assets for distribution 
in accordance with Italian law.  Thus, rather than just removing the dis-
ability of alienage, the treaty substituted the law of a foreign nation re-
garding inheritance for the law of a state.  The Court was once again un-
animous in upholding the treaty, with Chief Justice Hughes delivering 
the opinion.  Reminding his audience that treaties of this kind have reci-
procal benefits, Hughes observed: 
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that Golove’s nationalist perspective on the treaty power would 
carry the day over traditional state authority in the area of pri-
vate forest management, when no foreign power or its citizens 
were involved.  Golove indicated as much, ultimately asserting 
that “a treaty cannot . . . adopt domestic standards just because 
the President and Senate believe them to be laudable.  A treaty 
is unconstitutional if it does not serve a foreign policy interest 
or if it is concluded not to affect the conduct of other nations 
but to regulate our own.”282
Perhaps most tellingly, although Golove is one of the most 
vocal proponents of the nationalist view, his ultimate analysis 
actually argued against the use of the treaty power to trump 
traditional state authority over property rights.  Golove pro-
vided context by stating that: 
 
[N]ationalist view proponents do not argue that the treaty 
power, because it is exclusively granted to the federal gov-
ernment, is therefore free from federalism limitations that 
would apply to concurrent powers . . . .  [A]s I have also pre-
viously pointed out, they do not contend that the treaty 
power is categorically exempt from either affirmative fed-
eralism limitations, such as . . . the general Tenth Amend-
ment declaration that exercises of nondelegated authority 
are unconstitutional.283
Golove then made an analogy between separation of pow-
ers limitations and federalism limitations on the treaty power, 
noting that a treaty “purporting to authorize the President ra-
ther than Congress hereafter to make laws regulating inter-
state and foreign commerce would violate the separation of 
powers.  Even though a treaty can regulate particular matters 
falling within those subjects, it may not change the internal 
 
 
There can be no question as to the power of the Government of the 
United States to make the Treaty . . . .  The treaty-making power is 
broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our for-
eign relations, and agreement with respect to the rights and privi-
leges of citizens of the United States in foreign countries, and of the 
nationals of such countries within the United States, and the dispo-
sition of property of aliens dying within the territory of the respec-
tive parties, is within the scope of that power, and any conflicting 
law of the State must yield. 
Golove, supra note 21, at 1270–72 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Asakura, 265 U.S. at 341; Santovincenzo, 284 U.S. at 40). 
 282. Golove, supra note 21, at 1287–88. 
 283. Id. at 1285. 
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distribution of power between Congress and the President.”284
[l]ikewise, a treaty purporting to grant Congress hereafter 
legislative authority over, say, real property in the states, 
would fall afoul of federalism.  Although a treaty can regu-
late particular aspects of real property relations in the 
states, it cannot transfer legislative authority over those 
subjects from the states to Congress.  Beyond these cases, 
treaties are as subject to federalism as they are to the sepa-
ration of powers.
  
Strikingly, Golove argued that 
285
Although this statement can be read merely to mean that 
Congress cannot aggregate unto itself a general authority to 
regulate private property directly, Golove failed to explain how 
such an aggregation would be fundamentally different than al-
lowing individual treaties to “regulate particular aspects of real 
property relations.”  Apparently, based upon Golove’s own leng-
thy summary of examples, he would confine such regulation in 
the area of property rights to treaties affecting real property 
owned by foreign nationals. 
 
Ultimately, regardless of the contentious outcome of the 
“new federalism” versus “nationalist” debate on the scope of the 
treaty power—in the legislature, the courts, and the scholarly 
literature—it appears that it is at least uncertain whether the 
federal government can claim authority over private property 
rights—and land use activities like forest management—in 
light of potential federalism limits on the treaty power.  Not on-
ly does Missouri v. Holland raise such doubts, but so do the 
scholarly writings of parties on both sides of the “new federal-
ism” vs. “nationalist” debate.  If federalism does so limit the 
treaty power, then the federal government would not be able to 
implement prescriptive, “traditional governance” forest man-
agement directives on private lands pursuant to an interna-
tional treaty.  Any attempt to do so would result in Tenth 
Amendment judicial challenges, likely brought by both private 
landowners and state governments. 
 
 284. Id. at 1286. 
 285. Id. (emphasis added). 
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CONCLUSION 
The international community is properly increasing its fo-
cus on global forest management in the battle against climate 
change and is rightly taking an interest in forest management 
activities on a local scale.  This focus is essential to capture the 
full carbon sequestration value of the world’s forests, as well as 
to preserve the numerous other ecosystem services provided by 
sustainable forestry.  Achieving either a binding, stand-alone 
forest treaty or a climate treaty incorporating forest manage-
ment, however, will depend in large part on the United States’ 
willingness and ability to enter into and implement such a 
treaty.  U.S. federalism complicates the United States’ role in 
the formation of any treaty aimed at forests, since the federal 
government is granted authority under the Constitution to ne-
gotiate treaties, while state governments maintain primary 
regulatory authority over land use activities like forest man-
agement. 
The United States has a history of invoking federalism to 
inhibit treaty formation and implementation, and constitution-
al law scholars continue to debate whether federalism may act 
as a limit on the treaty power.  The uncertainty regarding fed-
eralism’s effect on the treaty power is compounded upon closer 
review of Missouri v. Holland, as the precedential value it 
holds for potential challenges to a future treaty aimed at forest 
management is unclear.  A review of the relationship between 
the treaty power and private property rights further demon-
strates that the extent to which the federal government may 
invoke the treaty power to regulate in the area of traditionally 
state-regulated land use activities is questionable, and the out-
er bounds of the federal government’s treaty power authority 
are ill-defined at best. 
In contrast, there is greater certainty regarding which me-
chanisms might be best employed to coordinate international 
forest management activities, as the increased global focus on 
bottom-up market-based mechanisms demonstrates.  Combin-
ing the uncertain with the “more certain,” it is apparent that at 
the current time the international community should avoid a 
global forest treaty based upon “traditional governance” and 
prescriptive mandates that may run afoul of federalism prin-
ciples in the United States.  Market-based initiatives like 
REDD, forest certification, and ecosystem service transaction 
programs would provide the best opportunity to achieve global 
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forest management goals and would do so with the uncompro-
mised leadership and participation of the United States.  The 
United States’ cooperation is crucial if the international com-
munity is ever to convince the Alabama forester to leave the 
oaks, poplars, sycamores, and pines on the creek bank and pro-
vide essential environmental benefits not only to rural Ala-
bama, but to the world. 
 
